The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes by Black, Derek
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 80 | Number 3 Article 5
3-1-2002
The Case for the New Compelling Government
Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes
Derek Black
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 923 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol80/iss3/5
The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest:
Improving Educational Outcomes
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, the federal courts have overturned
several school systems' policies that attempt to integrate and diversify
their student bodies by using race as a factor in admissions or class
placement.' Even those programs that have not been overturned
often have been heavily scrutinized.2 These decisions have left
universities, colleges, and elementary and secondary schools
scrapping for ways to justify their race-conscious and affirmative
action programs.3 Since the Supreme Court has come to view
programs that specifically benefit racial minorities in the same way
that it views practices that intentionally discriminate against
minorities, 4 educators often cannot find any justification other than
1. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-20 (1978)
(plurality opinion); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1237
(11th Cir. 2001); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999);
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 792 (1st Cir. 1998); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
934 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2001). See
generally GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE
OF RESEGREGATION 18 (2001), available at http:llwww.law.harvard.edulgroups/
civilrights/publications/resegregationOl/schoolsseparate.pdf (recognizing the shift in
federal courts' policy towards such programs) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
2. See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 745 (2d Cir.
2000); Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir.
1999); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819-30 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
3. See Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up to Their First Principles: Reflections
on the Value of Affirmative Action, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1299, 1319-20 (1999) (documenting
the responses of university administrators to the new challenges of obtaining a racially
diverse student body); Kira M. Feeny, Comment, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in
Higher Education: It's Not a Black and White Issue, 25 U. DAYTON L. REv. 109, 110
(1999) (discussing the ongoing legal attacks on race-based admissions programs); Harriet
Chiang, Affirmative Action Setback. State Supreme Court Rules Prop. 209 Prohibits
Minority-based Outreach, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 1, 2000, at Al (discussing the University of
California's scramble to determine whether a California Supreme Court decision would
end their newest version of affirmative action); Joel E. Sannes, Circuit Court Scrap-
Affirmative Action Path Unclear to Law Schools, ARIZONA ATr'Y, Oct. 2001, at 23-24
(discussing the price law schools are paying to defend their admissions programs).
4. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-30 (1995); see also
ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that the Supreme Court believes discrimination has
largely ended, thus causing it to take a new stance on race).
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that of remedying past discrimination.5  If educators intend to
continue promoting racial diversity through their admissions policies,
they must reconceptualize their motives and actions. No longer is
integration for the sake of integration a legitimate government
objective to pursue.6 Presumably, the best objective an educational
institution could pursue, by definition, is improving the education that
all students receive, regardless of race. A growing body of research
shows that racial diversity improves educational outcomes in several
distinct ways.7 Relying on this research, educators should change
their agenda from fostering diversity for its own sake to improving
educational outcomes through the means of diversity."
This Comment argues that such a shift would be justified and
would create an objective that meets the constitutional compelling
interest standard. This Comment focuses on addressing why these
educational systems have had such a difficult time justifying their
programs, and how they might succeed.9 First, this Comment details
the legal history of racial classifications and diversity in education,
laying out the Supreme Court's standards 0 and the lower courts'
5. See, e.g., Hopwood 78 F.3d at 944. In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit writes:
"Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that non-remedial state interests will
never justify racial classifications." Id.; see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1371-72 (S.D. Ga. 2000), affd, Johnson v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Ca., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the University's concept of diversity
to be too "amorphous" and based on speculation); MORGAN APPEL ET AL.,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, THE IMPACT OF
DIVERSITY ON STUDENTS: A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE 2
(1996) (stating that educators currently do not have data or knowledge about the effects of
diversity and therefore have nothing with which to justify their programs).
6. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (holding that the over-reliance on race for its own sake,
without any specific justification, was unconstitutional). Later Supreme Court
jurisprudence made it clear that amorphous governmental interests such as integration are
not by themselves sufficient to justify racial classifications. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235
(requiring that all uses of race be supported by compelling government interests and be
narrowly tailored).
7. See infra notes 151-56, 179-283 and accompanying text.
8. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1253 (11th Cir.
2001). The Court in Johnson makes it clear that pursuing diversity for its own sake would
be constitutionally insufficient. Id. at 1253 n.18. Rather, the focus should be on providing
a "superior education." Id. at 1253; see also Jonathan R. Alger, The Educational Value of
Diversity, ACADEME, Jan-Feb. 1997, at 20, 21 (stating that universities have gotten
themselves into trouble by making diversity and end in itself). Alger writes that
universities must now "fully and forcefully" articulate the educational benefits of diversity.
Id.
9. For a discussion of why this is important, see APPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 2
(stating that educators currently do not have the research evidence necessary to justify
their programs).
10. See infra notes 14-65 and accompanying text.
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interpretation and application of these standards." Second, this
Comment explores the educational research that has been developing
during the disposition of these cases, but which courts have yet to
consider adequately. 12 Finally, this Comment analyzes how this new
research fits into the current legal framework, and suggests that
proper application of the new research may allow certain racial
classifications to withstand judicial scrutiny and lead to different
outcomes.
I. CONTROLLING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment govern state and
federally imposed racial classifications. 4 Applying these clauses, the
Supreme Court has held that race-based classifications are
"inherently suspect."15  Thus, the Court subjects race-based
classifications to "strict scrutiny," requiring the government actor to
show: 1) a compelling interest to justify the use of the classification
and 2) means that are narrowly tailored to this interest. 6  Since
deciding City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,7 the Supreme Court has
required states to have a compelling interest that justifies the use of a
racial classification," regardless of whether the racial classification is
benign19 or invidious.20 In the educational context, a school's interest
in remedying de jure segregation or racial discrimination will
generally suffice as a compelling interest2 To show a compelling
11. See infra notes 66-150 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 151-285 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 286-348 and accompanying text.
14. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying
equal protection and due process analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
a program that benefited racial minorities in selecting contractors for federal construction
projects).
15. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
16. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235.
17. 488 U.S. 469 (1988).
18. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224-30 (stating that "any person, of whatever race, has the
right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial
scrutiny").
19. "Benign" racial classifications generally refer to those used in affirmative action
programs to benefit a historically disadvantaged minority. See id at 225.
20. "Invidious" racial classifications are those that have been used to discriminate
against and disadvantage minorities. It at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring).
21. Compliance with judicial desegregation orders that were handed down during the
1960s and 70s generally still serve as a compelling interest. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
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interest, the schools need only demonstrate that they are remedying
their own well-documented discrimination. 2 For schools that are
confronted with such segregation or discrimination, the most difficult
problem is not showing a compelling interest, but rather showing that
the means they have used to eliminate segregation or discrimination
are not overly broad under a narrowly tailored analysis. 3 However,
for those schools that cannot document racial discrimination, the first
obstacle is showing a compelling interest.24 Although it has never
held so, in some narrow instances the Supreme Court has suggested
that diversity is a compelling interest that might be relied on by
schools that cannot document that they are remedying
discrimination.15 As a result of the Supreme Court's ambiguous
stance towards diversity, the circuit courts are split.26 The primary
U.S. 70, 137 (1995) (discussing court orders to desegregate and how they relate to
compelling interests).
22. See id. at 112 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that state actors can enact
remedial programs "to further the compelling governmental interest in redressing the
effects of past discrimination").
23. See Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999)
(assuming, but not holding, that diversity is a compelling interest, but invalidating the
school's policy because it was not narrowly tailored). The "narrowly tailored" analysis
requires a tight congruence between the compelling interest and the means used to
achieve it. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,81 (2000) (discussing the need for
congruence and proportionality under Fourteenth Amendment). Adarand brought the
seriousness of this issue to the forefront when it demanded strict scrutiny of benign racial
classifications, thus requiring educational programs that were narrow in scope. See
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (holding that all racial classifications, including benign
classifications, are subject to strict scrutiny).
24. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch., 212 F.3d 738,746-47 (2d Cir. 2000).
25. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978). Justice
Powell argued that diversity was a compelling interest, though no other Justice in the
majority supported this suggestion. Id. Outside the educational context, the Court
explicitly recognized diversity as a justification for the use of racial classifications. See
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (upholding FCC minority
preference policies as substantially related to an important government objective).
However, the diversity rationale was only subjected to an intermediate level of scrutiny.
See id. (declining to apply strict scrutiny because the Court had yet to hold that strict
scrutiny applies to benign racial classifications).
26. Compare Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701 (assuming, but not holding, that diversity is a
compelling interest), with Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d
1061, 1063-65 (9th Cir. 1999) (accepting diversity as a compelling interest in the context of
operating a research-oriented school dedicated to improving the quality of education in
urban public schools), Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796-800 (1st Cir. 1998)
(rejecting a school's pursuit of diversity through "racial balancing"), Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting diversity as a compelling interest), Wittmer v.
Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920-21 (7th Cir 1996) (accepting a non-remedial use of race as a
compelling interest), Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 264 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th
Cir. 2001) (stating that the issue of diversity as a compelling interest is an open question
that should be decided by the Supreme Court), and Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School,
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case serving as the locus of confusion is Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.27
Bakke was the first Supreme Court case to question specifically
an affirmative action program in the educational context. In Bakke,
the University of California at Davis Medical School operated an
admissions program that reserved spots for minority applicants. 8
Bakke, a white student, applied to the medical school twice and was
denied admission both times.29 His grade point average and test
scores, however, were significantly higher than those of several
minority students who were admitted. 0 As a result, Bakke claimed
that the program was racially discriminatory. The majority of the
Court agreed and ruled in his favor.31 The Court held that setting
aside a certain number or percentage of seats for minority applicants
was an unconstitutional use of race that amounted to nothing more
than a quota system. 32 The Court, however, reached no consensus for
the reasoning behind its result; no single opinion received more than
four votes. 33 Since Justice Powell was the swing vote, many have
recognized his opinion as the functional equivalent of a majority
opinion.34 He wrote that "the attainment of a diverse student body...
is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education."35 The problem with this program, however, was its over-
reliance on race to achieve a diverse student body. Powell wrote that
if race had been but one of several factors, none of which were
determinative, or only a "plus" to a student's application strength, the
outcome may have been different.36 Therefore, Powell's opinion
233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[E]ducational diversity is a compelling governmental
interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures.").
27. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
28. Id. at 265.
29. 1k at 266.
30. Id
31. Id at 266-67.
32. Id.
33. Six different opinions were authored in Bakke. Id. at 267.
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188, 1198-2000 (9th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that Powell's opinion is the controlling precedent from Bakke); Michelle M.
Inouye, The Diversity Justification for Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Is
Hopwood v. Texas Right?, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 385, 389 (1997)
(arguing that Powell was the swing vote and his opinion has been considered as controlling
law); Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 1352 (noting that Powell's opinion has been regarded as
that of the Court).
35. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. Powell discussed the value of diversity at length in his
opinion and at one point wrote that the future of our nation depends on the robust
exchange of ideas and exposure to differing perspectives, which is promoted by diversity.
Id. at 312-13.
36. Id. at 316.
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suggests that diversity can be a compelling interest, and under proper
circumstances, race can be used as a factor to achieve that diversity.37
Since the Court's distaste for the admissions program in Bakke
was largely predicated on the existence of what it perceived as a strict
"quota" system, the application of strict scrutiny to other racial
classifications that benefited minorities, but did not use "quotas,"
remained unclear. During the decade that followed Bakke, the Court
moved to the political right38 and eventually settled the issue in City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,39 in which the Court held that strict
scrutiny would in fact apply to all racial classifications, even if they
benefited racial minorities.40 In Croson, Justice O'Connor reasoned
that distinguishing between benign and invidious classifications on
their face is impossible because benign racial classification can just as
easily be motivated "by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
simple racial politics."'" Justice O'Connor indicated that the very
"purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race
by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."'4 After Croson, even
a program that is designed to benefit minorities must have a
compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to this end.
The Supreme Court has recognized only a few interests as
sufficiently compelling to satisfy the first prong of the "strict scrutiny"
analysis. Remedying one's own discrimination is clearly accepted as a
compelling interest.43  This may include remedying past
37. Id. at 311-12; see also Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell
Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REv. 21, 32 (discussing the different opinions in Bakke and
concluding that Powell's opinion should allow courts to uphold certain types of admissions
programs).
38. Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb, The Supreme Court and New
Constitutional Eras, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 1183, 1197-1200 (1998) (discussing the shift in the
Supreme Court's ideological stance).
39. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
40. Id. at 493-94. In Croson, the City of Richmond operated a program that awarded
thirty percent of the total dollar amount of its construction contracts to minorities. Id. at
477-78. The city asserted that it was doing so to remedy past discrimination. Id. at 498.
The city also argued that strict scrutiny should not be applied to this racial classification
because it was benign. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that all racial
classifications, regardless of their motivations, are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 493-94.
41. Id. at 493. While Justice O'Connor wrote the judgment of the Court in Croson,
only three other justices joined her reasoning here. However, her position was later
adopted by the majority of the Court in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
42. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
43. See id. at 492 (stating that public entities have a compelling interest in preventing
public funds from being used to finance private prejudices); United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987) (stating that the government unquestionably has a compelling
[Vol. 80
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discrimination or breaking the hold of ongoing discrimination. 4 In
either instance, the Court requires strong evidence to prove that
discrimination is actually present.45 Often governmental entities
attempt to demonstrate this discrimination by showing that the
discrimination is traceable to de ]ure segregation.' in which case the
State is required affirmatively to remedy the problem.47 For example,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Fordice explicitly charged
schools to eradicate "policies and practices traceable to its prior de
jure dual system" that continue to foster segregation or have
discriminatory effects.49
However, the mere existence of a statistical disparity between
the educational outcomes of races is generally not sufficient to
establish a compelling interest that would allow a governmental actor
to use racial classifications to correct the disparity.50 Rather, the
disparity must be traceable to some prior or ongoing intentional
discrimination by the government." In addition, a state actor may
correct only its own specific acts of discrimination, not some other
actor's, and certainly not general societal discrimination to which
equal protection prohibitions do not apply5 The Court has said
repeatedly that the state is powerless to remedy societal
discrimination and any attempt to do so through racial classification is
unconstitutional 3
interest in remedying discrimination by a state actor); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Court is in agreement that,
whatever the formulation employed, remedying past or present racial discrimination by a
state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully
constructed affirmative action program.").
44. See Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MIcH. L. Rav. 1729, 1753 (1989) (stating that
Justice O'Connor's opinion requires a showing of past discrimination or onging
discrimination).
45. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
46. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of
Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 597, 610-11 (1996) (discussing the
importance of showing that discrimination is traceable to de jure segregation).
47. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717,724-25 (1992).
48. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
49. Id. at 728-29.
50. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-99 (1987) (holding that general
evidence of discrimination is not sufficient to prove discrimination against a specific
individual in the context of capital sentencing).
51. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-500.
52. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). Equal protection
prohibitions only apply to state action. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992).
53. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 485 (requiring a showing of prior governmental
discrimination, rather than societal discrimination in the private contracting industry, to
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In addition to upholding the remedial use of race,54 the Court has
upheld a non-remedial use of race.5 5 In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,56 the Court found that pursuing diversity and the benefits that
accrue from it sufficiently justifies the use of racial classifications5 7
Adarand Construtors, Inc. v. Pena'8  later overruled Metro
Broadcasting, but only to the extent Metro Broadcasting applied
intermediate scrutiny, not its approval of a non-remedial use of racial
classifications 9 Thus, although the Supreme Court has never
explicitly held that promoting diversity is a compelling interest under
strict scrutiny, some commentators suggest that it would be in certain
contexts, such as education. 0 Conversely, the Court has rejected
similar ends, such as providing role models for minority students or
reducing societal discrimination, holding that they fall short of a
compelling government interest.6 In summary, remedying well-
documented discrimination is always a compelling interest, but
whether the non-remedial use of race is compelling is unresolved, and
may well vary from context to context. In any case, when the Court
finds a compelling interest to justify the use of racial classifications, it
show a compelling interest); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 664-65 (1987)
(reiterating the mandates of Wygant); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76 (invalidating a minority
school teacher preference that was aimed at alleviating the effects of societal
discrimination).
54. Attempts to remedy racial discrimination are referred to as "remedial" uses of
race. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 486, 488.
55. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990). The Court did so under
an intermediate level of scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Id. at 564. This difference,
however, should be negligible because, as Justice O'Connor states, there is little relevant
difference between a "compelling" and "important" interest. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
56. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
57. 497 U.S. at 564-65.
58. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
59. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Killenbeck,
supra note 3, at 1372.
60. See Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 1372-73; Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in
Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 384-85 (1998). But see Barbara Phillips Sullivan, The Gift of
Hopwood. Diversity and the Fife Drum March Back to the Nineteenth Century, 34 GA. L.
REV. 291, 292-94 (1999) (arguing that diversity rationales reinforce white supremacy and
contradict the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments); Robert J. Donahue,
Note, Racial Diversity As a Compelling Government Interest, 30 IND. L. REv. 523, 549
(1997) (predicting that the Supreme Court will not find racial diversity to be a compelling
interest). This Comment concentrates on education only and does not suggest that the
Court would find diversity as a compelling interest outside of the educational context.
61. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267,276 (1986).
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will then examine the means to determine whether they are narrowly
tailored.62
The Court weighs several factors when deciding whether the
means are narrowly tailored, including: whether the government
considered race-neutral alternatives, the scope of the program in
question, whether a waiver mechanism narrows the scope, whether
race is the only factor in determining eligibility for a program or
whether race is just one factor in the decision making process,
whether the program has an intended numerical target for minorities,
the duration and possible stopping point of the program, and the
burden caused by the program.63 The extent to which each of the
factors applies, if at all, will vary from case to case. In any event, the
narrowly tailored requirement is difficult to meet because it requires
a very tight fit between the interest a state actor is pursuing and the
means it is using to achieve it.64 Often, a state actor will demonstrate
a compelling interest and still have its program invalidated under the
narrowly tailored part of strict scrutiny.6 Thus, a state frequently has
62. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
63. Scott R. Palmer, Diversity and Affirmative Action: Evolving Principles and
Continuing Legal Battles, in DIVERSrrY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 81, 83 (Gary Orfield & Michael Kurlaender eds., 2001) (quoting
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to General Counsels 19-20 (June 28, 1995)); see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion) (discussing the following factors: efficacy of
alternatives to the use of race; the flexibility and duration of the use of race; a waiver for
the use of race; and the impact on the rights of third parties).
64. Once a state identifies racial discrimination in one of its programs, it must be
careful to limit its remedy to correcting only that discrimination. A remedy that is
overbroad, either in addressing discrimination for which the state itself is not responsible
or that places minorities in a better position than they would have been absent the
discrimination, would be vulnerable. See generally Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd.,
195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (overturning a remedy because it was too broad). In more
simplistic terms, if a school has only denied admission to twenty-three minorities in the
past, it cannot now use racial classifications to offer an additional twenty-five spots to
minorities because it would be remedying more discrimination than it had previously
caused. In the modern context, however, it may be difficult to determine what the exact
harm done to minorities has been, and to quantify this harm in a way that would allow a
state to enact remedies narrowly tailored to remedying the harm. Carl L. Livingston,
Affirmative Action on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative Action and the Case for Its
Retention, 40 HOW. L.J. 145, 197 (1996) (discussing narrow tailoring and describing
discrimination as "difficult to quantify").
65. See, e.g., Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701; Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 799 (1st Cir.
1998). In Tuttle, the court assumed that the State had a compelling interest, but applying
the narrowly tailored analysis, it was troubled by the fact that the State had established no
logical stopping point to the race-based program in question. 195 F.3d at 706.
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the problem of knowing that it can or must act, but not knowing how
it can act constitutionally.66
II. CIRCUrr COURT APPLICATION OF RACE TO THE EDUCATION
CONTEXT
Not only have states had difficulty navigating these standards,
the circuits have had problems applying them. The first and probably
most important split among the circuits concerns whether non-
remedial uses of race can be legitimate compelling interests.67 The
Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas68 is the leading decision
rejecting non-remedial uses of race.69  The case involved an
admissions program at the University of Texas School of Law that
took race into account.70  The court first stated that there was no
specific evidence of racial discrimination by the law school to be
remedied, and then turned to the issue of whether non-remedial
purposes could be compelling.71 Although it failed to cite a Supreme
Court case in support of its assertion, the court in Hopwood wrote,
"subsequent Supreme Court decisions [to Bakke] regarding education
state that non-remedial state interests will never justify racial
classifications. ' 72 The court argued that the racial diversity interest
supported by Justice Powell 73 has never been accepted as compelling
66. For example, in United States v. Fordice, it was clear that a state actor had an
affirmative duty to remedy the past discrimination, but it was not clear what remedies
were appropriate. 505 U.S. 717,727-28 (1992) (stating in general terms only that a school
must use race-neutral policies and eradicate de jure discrimination).
67. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (comparing the differing circuit opinions
regarding the non-remedial use of diversity).
68. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (2-1 decision).
69. Id. at 934-35.
70. Id. at 936-38.
71. Id. at 948. The law school asserted that it was part of the larger system of
education in the entire state of Texas, which had discriminated based on race. Thus, the
law school argued that it could act to remedy disadvantage in its part of the system, which
was a result of discrimination in another part. I&. at 953-54. The court rejected this
argument totally, stating that "even if the state is the proper government unit to scrutinize,
the law school's admissions program would not withstand our review." Id at 951. The
court felt that the legislature would have had to have been the one to address
discrimination on a system-wide basis, not the law school. Id
72. Id. at 944. The court, however, was not unanimous in its conclusion about non-
remedial uses of race. See id. at 964 (Wiener, J., concurring). Furthermore, the circuit
refused a rehearing en banc over the vigorous dissent of seven other circuit judges.
Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (1996) (per curium). One author flatly states, "Hopwood
bears little precedential value and Bakke remains the controlling law on this subject."
Marty B. Lorenzo, Race-Conscious Diversity Admissions Programs: Furthering a
Compelling Interest, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 361,390 (1997).
73. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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under a strict scrutiny review.74 It distinguished the Supreme Court's
acceptance of diversity as a justification in Metro Broadcasting
because Metro was not decided under strict scrutiny.75 Therefore, the
court in Hopwood held that considering race in admissions with the
purpose of promoting student body diversity is not a compelling
interest and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment.76
Other circuits have simply avoided deciding whether diversity is
a compelling interest under strict scrutiny analysis. In Wessmann v.
Gittens,77 the Boston Latin School operated an affirmative action
program that sought to create a student body that was a diverse,
"'fair representation of a cross-section of students' of the Boston
public schools."7' In Wessmann, the First Circuit wrote:
It may be that the Hopwood panel is correct and that, were
the Court to address the question today, it would hold that
diversity is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify a
race-based classification. It has not done so yet, however,
and we are not prepared to make such a declaration in the
absence of a clear signal that we should.... As matters turn
out, we need not definitively resolve this conundrum today.
Instead, we assume arguendo-but we do not decide-that
Bakke remains good law and that some iterations of
"diversity" might be sufficiently compelling, in specific
circumstances, to justify race-conscious actions.79
Although it assumed that diversity is a compelling interest, the
First Circuit noted that several different types of diversity exist-not
all of which relate to ethnic or racial diversity.80 Arguing that the
Boston Latin School was overly concerned with racial diversity at the
expense of other types of diversity, the court held that the means the
school used were not narrowly tailored to the end of "true"
diversity.81
74. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
75. Id. at 944. The Court in Metro Broadcasting applied intermediate scrutiny
because the racial classification was "benign." 497 U.S. at 564-65. Relying on Adarand's
later holding that all racial classification will be subjected to strict scrutiny and Croson's
plurality opinion disapproving of a non-remedial use of race, the Hopwood court argued
that Metro Broadcasting's acceptance of diversity as a compelling interest is no longer
valid. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45.
76. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45.
77. 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
78. Id at 798.
79. Id. at 796 (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 798.
81. Id. at 799. The court states that the school's policy is, "at bottom, a mechanism for
racial balancing.... It cannot be said that racial balancing is either a legitimate or
necessary means of advancing the lofty principles recited in the Policy." Id
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The First Circuit's willingness to independently define diversity
as "true" diversity in its analysis of narrowly tailored requirements,
rather than accepting educators' definition, could be viewed as a
rejection of racial diversity as a compelling interest. That is, if the
court was sincere in assuming that diversity in education was a
compelling interest, it likely would have been more deferential to the
educators' professional judgment of diversity requirements.
Furthermore, for the court to say that it assumes "diversity" is a
compelling interest without understanding diversity to include racial
diversity is to assume nothing, because strict scrutiny would not be
triggered in the first place if all that a school did was assemble a
student body of diverse viewpoints. By examining what is meant by
educational "diversity" and coming to a conclusion that differs from
that of the educators, Wessmann, in effect, implicitly adopted the
Hopwood standard.'
The Fourth Circuit has also addressed racial classifications in
education. In Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board,3 a public
school system used a weighted lottery that factored in race to
determine admission to certain schools. 4  The Tuttle court
approached the issue in a similar fashion to the Wessmann court by
asserting that it would assume, but not hold, that diversity is a
compelling interest.85 It also followed the Wessmann court in finding
that the program in question was unconstitutional, and merely an
example of racial balancing.86 However, the Fourth Circuit did not go
into the Wessmann court's discussion of the meaning of "diversity."
Instead, it simply stated that the program engages in racial balancing
because it "skew[s] the odds of selection in favor of certain
minorities," and therefore resembles the racial quotas prohibited by
Bakke.' Thus, the Tuttle court's willingness to assume diversity,
however defined, is a compelling interest is arguably more genuine
than the Wessmann court's because the court here invalidates the
82. See Palmer, supra note 63, at 86 (stating that Wessmann adopted the Podberesky
standard, which was the same standard adopted by Hopwood).
83. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 701-02.
85. Id. at 701.
86. Id. at 707.
87. Id. This court's argument was bolstered by the finding that "if the applicant pool
does not reflect the required 15% racial and ethnic diversity, each child's probability of
selection in the lottery is adjusted corresponding to his or her stated race." Id. With such
a policy, it appears nearly impossible that the final number of minorities actually admitted
could be anything less than fifteen percent. Thus, "[a]Ithough the Policy does not
explicitly set aside spots solely for certain minorities, it has practically the same result."
Id.
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program on matters that are independent of how one defines
"diversity. ' ' s8
The Eleventh Circuit staked out a middle ground that appears to
fall between the First Circuit's apparently less than genuine
assumption of the validity of diversity and the Fourth Circuit's flat
rejection of a diversity program through a narrowly tailored analysis.
The Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue of diversity in a challenge
of the University of Georgia's admission program. While the
Eleventh Circuit in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of
Georgia' did ultimately find the University of Georgia's admission
program unconstitutional under a narrowly tailored analysis'°-
reflecting a perspective that functionally may be the same as that of
the Fourth Circuit-the Johnson court grappled with the substance of
the law on this issue before rendering its decision.91 First, the court
conducted an in depth analysis of Supreme Court and other circuit
court precedents in attempting to answer what it though to be the key
issue: "whether student body diversity may be a compelling
interest."'  After a lengthy review, the court decided that "the
constitutional viability of student body diversity as a compelling
interest is an open question, and ultimately one ... that warrants
consideration by the Supreme Court."93  Rather than attempt to
answer a question that the circuit suggested only the Supreme Court
can answer, it assumed for the purposes of this case that diversity is a
compelling interest.'
The manner in which the court applied its narrowly tailored
review suggested that its assumption of diversity's validity was
genuine. The court took a deliberate look at the narrow tailoring
factors other courts have used in other contexts, such as
employment.95 The court then sculpted a set of factors that it found
88. In addition, the racial balancing issue was not necessary for the court's decision
because the lack of a logical stopping point for the program also rendered it violative of
narrowly tailored requirement. Id. at 706.
89. 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
90. IM at 1237.
91. Id at 1244-54 (attempting to ascertain the law on whether diversity can be a
compelling interest and shaping narrow tailoring factors that are relevant to the context of
education).
92. Id at 1242. The court spent seven pages discussing Bakke and cases from other
circuits in reaching the conclusion that whether diversity is a compelling interest is an open
question. Id at 1244-50.
93. Id at 1245.
94. Id. at 1245-46.
95. Id at 1252-53.
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more relevant to the issue of diversity in education.96 Although the
court ultimately found the Georgia program unconstitutional using
these factors, their use reflects the court's willingness to adopt an
analysis that takes into account both the reality of how diversity is
used in the educational context as well as the logic behind it-97  For
instance, it found that factors like the duration of the program "may
not be an important consideration," because unlike remedying past-
discrimination, which has a logical stopping point, "the goal of
exposing students to a diverse student body may not."'"s The court's
central concern in its analysis appeared to be the flexibility of the
program used to achieve diversity.99 If a program were flexible in its
use of race, the types of diversity it considers, and its examination of
admissions applications, the court seemed willing to permit it. One
can disagree with the court's ultimate disapproval of the University's
policy, but it was merely the court's perception that the University
gave too much weight to race -- the amount of which the University
was unable to justify"1-and the University's failure to take other
diversity factors into account that caused the court to find the
program unconstitutional, not a rejection of diversity."° The court
neither explicitly nor implicitly questioned the validity of pursuing
diversity. Rather, the court's opinion gave the University a good
notion of what type of program would be constitutional.
Several other circuit courts have decided the issue of diversity
and non-remedial uses of race different than Wessmann, Johnson, or
Tuttle. For example, in Wittmer v. Peters,10 the Seventh Circuit
96. Id. at 1253. The factors that the court found relevant to the narrowly tailored
review of diversity in education were: whether race is used in a rigid or mechanical way
that does not take into account other factors that relate to diversity, whether race-neutral
factors that relate to diversity are taken into account, whether a diversity program gives
disproportionate or arbitrary weight to race, and whether a school has genuinely
considered race-neutral alternatives for creating a diverse student body. Id.
97. Id. at 1252-53 (discussing the need to formulate factors in the narrowly tailored
analysis that are relevant to diversity in education).
98. 1. at 1252; Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811,824 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
99. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1254-55 (honing on the issue of flexibility and finding the
lack of it to be a "fatal flaw").
100. Id. at 1255-56.
101. Id. at 1257. The court quotes the admissions director as stating that the weight the
school gives race is made "out of the blue." Id. The University's counsel also admits that
there is no statistical basis for choosing the weight the school gives to race. hi.
102. Id. at 1255 (discussing the University's failure to give sufficient weight to other
factors).
103. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996). This case occurred in the context of the penal system
and is, therefore, not directly applicable to schools, but its discussion on the use of race is
important in answering the question of whether race can be used for non-remedial
purposes. In this case, the plaintiffs were white men who argued that a less qualified
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recognized that "the rectification of past discrimination is not the only
setting in which government officials can lawfully take race into
account in making decisions."' Furthermore, the court pointed out
that the cases suggesting otherwise do so only in dicta and not in
holdings.10 5 With this as a framework, the court held that the State
could use race in the selection of prison personnel when evidence
shows the presence of minority personnel is critical to the prison's
success.1
06
While recognizing that the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected
the "role model" argument as a compelling non-remedial interest, the
Seventh Circuit in Wittmer noted that the State's action did not rest
on a role model theory.0 7 Rather, the correctional system had an
important management and security interest at stake. Unrebutted
expert testimony provided that a "black lieutenant is needed because
the black inmates are believed unlikely to play the correctional game
of brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some
blacks in authority in the camp. '  The testimony concluded that the
prison boot camp would have failed unless a black male was
promoted to a lieutenant position.09 Limiting its decision to these
circumstances, the court held that the race-conscious policies were
permissible for this non-remedial purpose."0 At the very least, this
individual was promoted to the rank of lieutenant over them because he was black. l at
917. In a test given to the applicants for the position, the man who was promoted to
lieutenant ranked forty-second, whereas the white plaintiffs ranked third, sixth, and
eighth. Id The State did not deny that race was a factor in his promotion, nor did its
justification rest upon remedying past discrimination. Id.
104. Id at 919.
105. Id
106. Id at 920-21. The "evidence" used to justify the use of race in this context was
the prison's own expert testimony that black lieutenants were needed. Id. at 920. The
point to be made here is that just as prison officials have expert judgments about how their
prisons should be run, so do education officials have expert opinions about how their
students should be educated; in both cases the courts should recognize this and defer to
the experts. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 208 (1982) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42
(1973), for the proposition that "courts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience'
necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy' "); Mrs. B. v.
Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2nd Cir. 1997) (holding that courts may not
second guess educators' policy decisions).
107. Wittmer, 87 F-3d at 919-20 (referring to the Supreme Court's holding in Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), that retaining minority teachers to serve as role
models was not a compelling interest).
108. Id at 920.
109. IdL
110. Id The court makes clear that the State could not have taken steps to make the
"racial composition of the security staff mirror that of the inmate population." Id There
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decision suggests that other situations, including the educational
arena, may justify the non-remedial use of race. Just as prisons
present special circumstances about which prison personnel and
administrators have expert knowledge (and to which courts should
defer) so do school systems.'
The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed whether special
circumstances in the educational context would justify non-remedial
uses of race in Hunter ex. reL Brandt v. Regents of the University of
California."2 In Hunter, the University of California at Los Angeles
Graduate School of Education operated an elementary school as a
research laboratory." The purpose of the school was "to help the
State of California meet the needs of a dramatically changing public
school population.""' 4 Furthermore, the school used the research it
collected to identify issues that are specifically relevant to the
education and social development of children from multiracial, urban
communities."5 From this research, the graduate school developed
more effective techniques to teach these communities, and shared its
findings with public schools throughout California."6 In making
admissions determinations for the elementary school, the University
considered gender, race or ethnicity and family income." 7 The court,
after applying strict scrutiny to the program, held that in light of the
purpose of doing research to benefit California's public education
system the "interest in operating a research-oriented elementary
school is compelling."" 8  This holding represents an explicit
recognition of a non-remedial compelling interest in the educational
context. Furthermore, the court also found that the means used to
achieve this end were narrowly tailored." 9 The court recognized that
a racially diverse student population was necessary to do the research
was a specific compelling need that required a specific response, nothing more. Such
needs may or may not occur in other prisons. Id
111. See supra note 106. Courts can easily second guess educators, but their second
guessing by definition comes from a detached position that may bear little or no relevance
to the reality of the educational setting. See supra note 106 (discussing the need to defer
to educators).
112. 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
113. Id. at 1062.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id In the interest of selecting favorable research subjects, the University also
considered the child's dominant language and residency and the parent's willingness to
meet a mandatory involvement requirement. Id.
118. Id. at 1064.
119. Id. at 1067.
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and thus did not apply the narrowly tailored means analysis in a way
that would second guess the State's methods of defining or pursuing
diversity. 121 Since "it would not be possible, nor would it be
reasonable, to require the defendants to attempt to obtain an
ethnically diverse representative sample of students without the use
of specific racial targets and classifications,'' the court did not force
the State to respond to a litany of unreasonable hypotheticals or
suggest that the State's purpose was racial balancing.
In a more recent case, the Second Circuit moved beyond a fact-
specific holding and recognized the reduction of racial isolation as
another compelling non-remedial interest. The court in Brewer v.
West Irondequoit Central School District' addressed a school
placement program that allowed only minority students to transfer
from urban school districts to suburban school districts, and only
nonminority students to transfer from suburban school districts to
urban school districts12 The main purpose of this voluntary program
was to eliminate minority isolation in the urban schools. 24 The court
considered the districts' actions as an attempt to reduce de facto
segregation, but based on the record the court could not determine
whether de facto segregation actually existed in the districts."2 Since
there was no claim that intentional discrimination was ever present,
the district's use of race was by definition non-remedial. The Brewer
court noted that Croson did not address the issue of non-remedial
uses of race 26 and held that local schools can voluntarily remedy de
facto segregation and, indeed, such action serves important societal
functions.27 Under the narrowly tailored analysis, the court held that
the proper inquiry is whether the means are narrowly tailored to
reducing racial isolation, not whether they are narrowly tailored to
some goal of "true diversity."' This is a direct rejection of the type
120. Id.
121. Id at 1066.
122. 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
123. Id. at 741.
124. Id at 742. The program also identifies other goals, including encouraging
intercultural learning, promoting academic excellence, and fostering responsible civic
leadership. Id.
125. Id. at 745.
126. Id. at 748 (citing Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996)).
127. Id at 751 (referring to Balaban v. Rubin, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574, 581-83 (1964), affd,
199 N.E.2d 375, (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964); see also Willan v. Menomonee
Falls Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 1416, 1422 (E.D. Wis. 1987)).
128. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 752.
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of narrow tailoring that the Fifth Circuit applied in Wessmann.2 9 The
acceptance of racial isolation as a compelling interest under strict
scrutiny is also a direct rejection of the Hopwood court's compelling
interest analysis.130
The Ninth Circuit has also directly revisited the issue of diversity
in the recent case Smith v. University of Washington,'3' and adopted a
position that in no way can be reconciled with Hopwood.'32 To date,
Smith is the strongest circuit decision in support of diversity. The
court- devoted almost the entire substance of its decision toward
deciding what the law of the land is on this issue, ultimately finding
that Bakke permits universities to use race as a factor in attaining a
diverse student body.133  The Circuit hinged its analysis on the
Supreme Court's mandate in Marks v. United States."4 The Marks
Court wrote, "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
... the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.' ,13
In order to determine the narrowest holding of the Court, the
Ninth Circuit systematically analyzed the various different stances of
the Justices in Bakke.3 6 In doing so, the Smith court found that the
constitutional interpretation that separates Justice Powell's decision
from that of four other Justices-Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun-is how expansively they would allow a university to use
129. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798-99 (1st Cir. 1998) (using a narrowly
tailored analysis to hold that the school was not pursuing true diversity). The Brewer
court remained true to its framework, unlike the court in Wessmann. The court in Brewer
wrote that it accepts reducing isolation as a compelling interest and then examined the
program to determine if it was narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of reducing
racial isolation. The Wessmann court stated that it assumed diversity was a compelling
interest, but when it examined the program, rather than seeing whether it was narrowly
tailored to diversity, the court quarreled with the type of diversity the program pursued.
The Wessmann court sought to redefine the type of diversity the program should pursue
rather than actually assuming that "diversity" (as conceptualized by educators) was a
compelling interest. In effect, the Wessmann court substitutes its judgment for that of
educators.
130. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that non-remedial
uses of races can never constitute a compelling interest).
131. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
132. Id. at 1201 n.9.
133. Id at 1197.
134. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
135. Id. at 193.
136. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1198-1200.
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race. 37 Powell would only permit its use in limited circumstances and
ways, whereas the other four Justices also would have permitted a
much more expansive use of race." By logical necessity, the other
four Justices would have approved of programs that met Powell's
test.139 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that Powell's was the narrowest
rationale upon which the five Justices would agree, and therefore
under Marks is the holding of the Court."4 In addition, because the
Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of university admissions,
nor has it "indicated that Justice Powell's approach has lost its
vitality," the Smith court concluded that race can be used as a factor
in university admissions programs.4
While anticipating which if any of the circuit court cases will
reach the Supreme Court is nearly impossible, the Sixth Circuit is
currently deliberating one of the most watched cases in the country
dealing with diversity. The case before the Sixth Circuit combines
two district court cases from the Eastern District of Michigan, Gratz
v. Bollinger4 ' and Grutter v. Bollinger.'43 Both cases have gained
national attention." The judge in the first case held that diversity was
a compelling interest and upheld the University of Michigan's
undergraduate admission program."' The other judge, reviewing the
University of Michigan Law School admission program, held diversity
137. Id. at 1198-99.
138. Id. at 1199.
139. Id. at 1199-1200.
140. Id.
141. Id at 1200.
142. 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
143. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
144. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, Mich. Admissions Policy Rejected; Ruling Muddles
Legal Status of Affirmative Action at Colleges, WASH. POST, Mar, 28, 2001, at A2; Judi
Wilgoven, U.S. Court Bars Race as Factor in School Entry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at
Al.
145. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 820. In Gratz, the University of Michigan did not
attempt to justify its use of race as remedial. Rather, the University asserted that among
its admissions objectives was the objective to "compose a class of students from diverse
races, ethnicities, cultures, and socioeconomic backgrounds." Id at 814. Based on
extensive research, the University sought to prove that such an environment resulted in
educational benefits. Id. at 822. The district court applied strict scrutiny to the program.
Id. at 816. However, first the court analyzed the multiple opinions of Bakke, and found
that although no five Justices agreed that diversity was a compelling interest, five Justices
did agree "that universities may take race into account in admissions when done so
properly." Id at 819. Thus, the district court concludes that diversity is a compelling
interest in the context of higher education and that this conclusion is further supported
"with solid evidence regarding the educational benefits." Id. at 820, 822. Furthermore,
upon reviewing the specifics of the program, the court found that program was narrowly
tailored using the traditional factors, flexibility, race-neutral alternatives, etc. Id. at 827-
31.
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did not rise to the level of a compelling interest, and furthermore
that the program was not narrowly tailored.'47 Other than different
judges, distinguishing between these cases is difficult since the same
attorneys litigated the cases and they presented much of the same
expert evidence."4 The importance of these cases, however, is that
they set themselves apart from the others discussed above, because
here a full record with expert testimony from researchers was
developed on the issue of diversity. Unlike the other circuits that
only speculated on or assumed the value of diversity based on
personal opinions or Supreme Court dicta, the Michigan cases
involved testimony by researchers who had conducted studies and
reviewed relevant data to assess the issue. Possibly for this reason,
many commentators expect this to be the case that the Supreme
Court finally takes to decide the issue of diversity149
After the Sixth Circuit's decision in the Michigan cases, the
circuits will have surely completed a full spectrum of ways to interpret
and apply Supreme Court precedent on race-conscious diversity
programs. However, until the Supreme Court speaks on the issue or
until new evidence and ways of approaching the issue are developed,
146. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
147. Id. at 850. At the outset, the district court in Grutter heavily scrutinized the law
school's admissions procedures, fettering out the exact nature of the use of race in the
procedure. Id. at 825-40. The court then analyzed Bakke and some other affirmative
action cases that followed it. Id at 843-50. Ultimately, the court decided that Justice's
Powell's discussion of diversity "is not among the governing standards to be gleaned from
Bakke." Id. at 847. Furthermore, later Supreme Court decisions reject Powell's rationale.
Id. at 848. Unlike other courts, the district court here refused to apply the framework of
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), that controls how one should interpret a
fragmented decision. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 847. The court's reasoning was that there
is no "narrow" holding in regard to diversity upon which Bakke can stand. Before leaving
the subject, however, the court discussed diversity in a similar fashion to that of the First
Circuit in Wessman, making a distinction between racial diversity and viewpoint diversity.
ld. at 849. Thus, the court resembles the First Circuit in being highly skeptical of race's
ability to achieve "diversity" as the court conceives it. Id. at 849-50. Yet even if racial
diversity were a compelling interest, the court argued that the law school's admissions
program was not narrowly tailored, particularly focusing on the defense's inability to
pinpoint the size of a "critical mass," and its failure to create a stopping point for the
program. Id at 850-51. Finally, the court criticized the program for resembling a quota
system and disregarding distinctions between minorities. Id. at 851-52.
148. Sannes, supra note 3, at 23 (discussing the difference between the cases as one
judge validating diversity and the other repudiating it).
149. Sannes, supra note 3, at 22-23 (stating that the circuits have created a rift the
Supreme Court will soon decide and discussing the Michigan cases as the place where the
Supreme Court might decide). See Victor G. Rosenblum, Surveying the Current Legal
Landscape for Affirmative Action in Admissions, 27 J.C. & U.L. 709, 727 (2001) (stating
that the Michigan cases are likely to come before the Supreme Court).
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the direction that schools should take is far from clear. 5° Regardless,
the research on racial diversity in education appears promising in
justifying new government interests should the issue be taken up by
the Supreme Court.
III. RESEARCH ON THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL DIVERSITY IN
EDUCATION
Given the uncertainty and divergence in the circuits regarding
whether pursuing diversity through non-remedial uses of race can be
a compelling governmental interest, analyzing the research that
identifies the concrete benefits that arise from diversity in the
educational system is essential to predicting how the Supreme Court
should resolve the issue. A great deal of research supports the
conclusion that racial diversity in educational settings results in
several benefits for primary, secondary, and post-secondary
students. 5 ' These benefits include better teaching and learning,'
150. See APPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (suggesting that schools need to grasp the
educational evidence before pursuing a course of conduct).
151. See, e.g., Patricia Gurin, Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, reprinted in 5 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 363 (1999) (expert report for Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97-75321 (E.D. Mich.
2000); Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 2001)) (showing positive
correlations between increased cross-racial student interactions and several learning,
democracy, and living and working outcomes); Alexander W. Astin, Diversity and
Multiculturalism on the Campus: How Are Students Affected?, CHANGE, Mar./Apr. 1993,
at 44,46 (showing how a racially diverse student body on college campuses changes social
attitudes and activities); Carl Bankston, III & Stephen J. Caldas, The American School
Dilemma: Race and Scholastic Performance, 38 SOC. Q. 423, 428 (1997) (showing racially
integrated settings are linked to improved achievement for black high school students);
Jomills Henry Braddock, II & James M. McPartland, The Social and Academic
Consequences of School Desegregation, in EQUITY AND CHOICE 5, 63-68 (1988)
[hereinafter Braddock & McPartland, Social and Academic Consequences] (showing both
long and short term consequences of racially diverse primary and secondary schools and
colleges, including improved race relations, increased academic achievement, and
preparation for diverse work settings); Marvin P. Dawkins & Jomills Henry Braddock, II,
The Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and African
American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 394, 397-400 (1994)
(reviewing studies showing that black students from majority white elementary and
secondary schools are more likely to persist at majority white colleges, have higher job
expectations, move into integrated neighborhoods, acquire jobs, major in scientific or
technical fields, and work in desegregated work environments); Maureen T. Hallinan,
Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733
(1998) (providing social science evidence supporting the theory that racial diversity
promotes educational benefits in primary and secondary schools and in higher education);
Sylvia Hurtado, Linking Diversity and Educational Purpose: How Diversity Affects the
Classroom Environment and Student Development, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra
note 63, at 197 (finding that persons who studied with someone of another race reported
greater growth in racial and cultural tolerance, leadership, critical thinking skills, and
problem solving skills); MATHTECH, INC., THE OUTCOMES OF DIVERSITY IN HIGHER
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EDUCATION, in MID-YEAR REPORT PREPARED FOR OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL
RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, VII-4 to VII-7 (1998) (concluding that racial diversity
has positive effects on student cognitive growth, interaction in the diverse work
environment, and breaking down racial stereotypes); Janet Ward Schofield, Review of
Research on School Desegregation's Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students,
in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 597 [hereinafter
HANDBOOK] (James A. Banks ed., 1995) (providing an overview of the social science
evidence, both positive and negative, behind the value of diversity in primary and
secondary education); Robert E. Slavin, Cooperative Learning and Intergroup Relations, in
HANDBOOK, supra, 628, 632 [hereinafter Slavin, Cooperative Learning] (showing that
cooperative learning in racially diverse primary and secondary schools can improve racial
attitudes and academic achievement among all students); Robert E. Slavin, Effects of
Biracial Learning Teams on Cross-Racial Friendships, 71 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 381, 386
(1979) [hereinafter Slavin, Effects of Biracial Learning] (showing the long term positive
effects of interracial cooperative learning); Maurianne Adams & Yu-Hui Zhou-
McGovern, The Sociomoral Development of Undergraduates in a "Social Diversity"
Course: Developmental Theory, Research and Instructional Applications, 27-29, 34-76
(Apr. 1994) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational
Research Association, New Orleans) (showing positive effects on cognitive development
and achievement) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
152. See, e.g., Gurin, supra note 151 (concluding from a longitudinal study that cross-
racial student interactions have a positive effect on learning); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, DOES DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? THREE
RESEARCH STUDIES ON DIVERSITY IN COLLEGE CLASSROOMS (2000) (analyzing data
from college faculty member questionnaires, including the role that diversity plays in
increasing cognitive learning); APPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at v (reviewing research that
shows racial diversity improves academic development and success in higher education);
RICHARD A. WHITE, LAW SCHOOL FACULTY VIEWS ON DIVERSITY IN THE CLASSROOM
AND THE LAw SCHOOL COMMUNITY (2000) (surveying law school professors' opinions
about the positive and possible negative effects of diversity in the classroom); Braddock &
McPartland, Social and Academic Consequences, supra note 151, at 8-9 (providing an
overview of the academic consequences of school desegregation); Thomas D. Cook, What
Have Black Children Gained Academically From School Integration? Examination of the
Meta-Analytic Evidence, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT, 6, at
41 (T. Cook et al. eds., 1984) (concluding that desegregated schools have a positive effect
on black students' reading scores); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, School Racial
Composition and Black College Attendance and Achievement Test Performance, 51 SOC.
EDUC. 81, 98-99 (1978) (showing positive effects of desegregation on black students'
achievement in the North, but negative effects in the South, possibly from exposure to a
hostile environment); Roxane Harvey Gudeman, Faculty Experience with Diversity: A
Case Study of Macalester College, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 63, at 258
(finding that "faculty deem diversity to be an asset to teaching and learning"); Hurtado,
supra note 151, at 198 (showing that persons who studied with someone of another race
reported growth in critical thinking skills); MATHTECH, INC., supra note 151, at V-4
(concluding that racial diversity positively affects student cognitive growth); Jeffery
Milem, The Educational Benefits of Diversity: Evidence from Multiple Sectors, in
COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION (Mitchell Chang et al. eds., forthcoming summer 2002) (analyzing
multidisciplinary research that shows the learning benefits of attending a racially diverse
college); Slavin, Cooperative Learning, supra note 151, at 632 (providing an overview of
studies showing the improved academic achievements of students in racially diverse
cooperative learning situations); Ernest T. Pascarella et al., What Have We Learned from
the First Year of the National Study of Student Learning?, 37 J.C. & STUDENT DEV. 182,
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improved civic values,153 increased employment opportunities, 154 and
higher achievement and more educational opportunities. 55 Both
188 (1996) (summarizing a federally funded study that found positive effects of racial
diversity on students' cultural openness); Case Note, An Evidentiary Framework for
Diversity As a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1372-73
(1996) (discussing several studies that demonstrate that diversity positively affects
educational outcomes); Adams & Zhou-McGovern, supra note 151, at 33-34 (showing
that participation in a social diversity course has a positive effect on students' cognitive
development by exposing them to different perspectives).
153. See, e.g., Gurin, supra note 151 (showing the positive effects of racial diversity on
democracy); APPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at v (reviewing literature that shows that racial
diversity changes attitudes); Jomills Henry Braddock, II et al., A Long-Term View of
School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduates as Adults, PHI DELTA KAPPAN
259, 260-61 (Dec. 1984) (discussing several studies that show white and black students
who attend desegregated schools are more likely to attend diverse colleges as adults, live
in integrated neighborhoods, work in diverse firms, and have friends of another racial
group); Jomills Henry Braddock, II & James McPartland, Social-Psychological Processes
That Perpetuate Racial Segregation: The Relationship Between School and Employment
Desegregation, 19 J. BLACK STUD. 267, 283-84 (1989) [hereinafter Braddock &
McPartland, Social-Psychology Processes] (suggesting that high school desegregation
promotes positive perceptions and social contacts among blacks and whites); Braddock &
McPartland, Social and Academic Consequences, supra note 151, at 68-70 (showing
positive race relations and preparation for future diverse settings as a consequence of
desegregation); Dawkins & Braddock, supra note 151, at 399 ("Blacks who attend
desegregated schools are more likely to move into integrated neighborhoods and have a
greater number of White friends."); Marcia Edison et al., Influences on Students' Openness
to Diversity and Challenge in the First Year of College, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 174, 187-92
(1996) (measuring the influence of diversity on college campuses); Hallnan, supra note
151, at 745, 750 (discussing studies that show diversity reduces racial prejudice and
increases interracial friendliness); Maureen T. Hallinan & Steven S. Smith, The Effects of
Classroom Racial Composition on Students' Interracial Friendliness, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q.
3, 13-14 (1985) (showing that desegregated classrooms increase interracial friendships);
Willis D. Hawley et al., Strategies for Reducing Racial Prejudice: Essential Principles for
Program Design, in TOWARD A COMMON DESTINY 423, 426-27 (W.D. Hawley & A.W.
Jackson eds., 1995) (suggesting ways that diversity can reduce racial prejudice and
improve racial equality); MATHTECH, INC., supra note 151 (concluding that racially
diverse education opportunities positively affect interaction in diverse work environments
and break down racial stereotypes); Milem, supra note 152, at 11 (showing improved civic
values as a benefit of racial diversity in education); Janet W. Schofield, School
Desegregation and Intergroup Relations: A Review of the Literature, in REVIEW OF
RESEARCH IN EDUCATION 335 (G. Grant ed., 1991) (providing a historical overview of
research on the effects of desegregation on intergroup relations); Janet W. Schofield &
Rebecca Eurich-Fulcer, When and How School Desegregation Improves Intergroup
Relations, in INTERGROUP PROCESSES 487 (Rupert Brown & Samuel L. Gaertner eds.,
2001) (stating that cross-racial integration has been proven to improve race relations);
Slavin, Cooperative Learning, supra note 151, at 633 (reviewing studies that show
cooperative learning in racially diverse settings improves racial attitudes and friendships
among all students); Slavin, Effects of Biracial Learning, supra note 151 (showing the
positive effects of cooperative learning on interracial friendships); Peter B. Wood &
Nancy Sonleitner, The Effect of Childhood Interracial Contact on Adult Antiblack
Prejudice, 20 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 1, 14-15 (1996) (concluding cross-racial
interaction among children has a positive long-term effect on decreasing racial prejudice
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toward blacks); Case Note, supra note 152, at 1373 (discussing studies that show the
positive effect of diversity on cultural awareness.
154. See, e.g., Braddock et al., supra note 153, at 260-61 (reviewing studies concluding
that going to desegregated schools positively affects opportunities to work in diverse
environments); Jomills Henry Braddock, II et al., Why Desegregate? The Effects of School
Desegregation on Adult Occupational Desegregation of African Americans, Whites and
Hispanics, 31 INT'L J. CONTEMP. SOC. 273, 280 (1994) (showing that black, white and
Mexican Americans who attend desegregated high schools are more likely to work in
desegregated firms); Jomills Henry Braddock, II & James M. McPartland, How Minorities
Continue to Be Excluded from Equal Employment Opportunities: Research on Labor
Market and Institutional Barriers, 43 J. Soc. ISSUES 5, 8 (1987) [hereinafter Braddock &
McPartland, How Minorities Continue to Be Excluded] (addressing the issue of segregated
social networks and reduced opportunities for minorities who attend predominantly
racially isolated schools); Braddock & McPartland, Social and Academic Consequences,
supra note 152, at 9-10 (reviewing the consequences of school desegregation, including
preparation for future racially diverse work environments); Braddock & McPartland,
Social-Psychology Processes, supra note 153, at 271-72 (explaining the relationship
between desegregated schools and integrated work environments, along with positive
interactions within the work environment); Dawkins & Braddock, supra note 151, at 397-
400 (reviewing studies showing the positive effects of school desegregation on integrating
the work environment); Gurin, supra note 151 (citing work outcomes as a positive effect of
racially diverse educational opportunities); James M. McPartland & Jomills Henry
Braddock, II, Going to College and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in
EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: EQUALITY, QUALITY, AND FEASIBILITY 141, at
141 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981) [hereinafter McPartland & Braddock, Going to College]
(arguing that the major positive effects of going to desegregated elementary and
secondary schools are increased opportunities in both higher education and the job
market); Milem, supra note 152, at 12-15 (finding that those students who attend diverse
colleges often earn higher wages and are more prepared to ender the global economy);
Schofield, supra note 151, at 605-07 (providing an overview of social science evidence on
the effects of school desegregation on African American's occupational attainment);
William Trent, Outcomes of School Desegregation: Findings from Longitudinal Research,
66 J. NEGRO EDUC. 255, 256-57 (1997) (discussing a survey that shows that desegregated
schooling has a positive benefit for black students' later earnings and occupational
attainment); Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-
term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. EDUC. RES. 531,552-53 (1994) (concluding
that school desegregation leads to increased job attainment for minorities); Anthony P.
Carnevale, Campus Diversity and the New Economy 20 (Jan. 14-16, 1999) (paper
presented at ACE conference on Achieving Inclusion and Equity in Higher Education)
(describing the reality and value of diversity in business today and arguing that diverse
educational institutions better prepare students for employment than segregated
institutions) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
155. The achievement and opportunity benefits accrue especially for black students.
See, e.g., Bankston & Caldas, supra note 151, passim (documenting the increased
achievement on graduation exams for black students in racially diverse environments);
Braddock & McPartland, Social and Academic Consequences, supra note 151, passim
(providing an overview of school desegregation consequences, including increased
academic achievement); Dawkins & Braddock, supra note 151, at 397-400 (providing an
overview of several studies illustrating the long-term benefits of school desegregation,
especially minority inclusion in the job market and society as a whole); Rita E. Mahard &
Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in THE
CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 103, at 124 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis
D. Hawley eds., 1983) (showing the positive effects of desegregation on minority
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minority and non-minority students realize these benefits.156 In fact,
the research so uncontrovertibly proves that diversity benefits
students that those who oppose the use of race in admissions did not
even attempt to rebut the evidence in the well-publicized case
involving the admissions program at the University of Michigan.1 57
Furthermore, plaintiffs in that case were willing to assume that
diversity is "good, important, and valuable. '" 158
Traditionally, the legal community has thought of racial diversity
as purely a matter of desegregation and integration instead of as an
educationally recognizable benefit to all students.159 After Brown v.
achievement); McPartland & Braddock, Going to College, supra note 154, at 141 (arguing
that increased educational opportunities for minorities result from desegregated schools);
Slavin, Cooperative Learning, supra note 151, passim; Wells & Crain, supra note 154, at
546 (providing an overview of studies on the long-term benefits of desegregation for black
students, which include increased educational attainment); Jomills Henry Braddock, II,
Black Student Attendance at Segregated Schools and Colleges: More Evidence on the
Perpetuation of Segregation Across Levels of Education, (1986) (paper presented at the
National Conference on School Desegregation Research, The University of Chicago,
Chicago, IL) [hereinafter Braddock, Perpetuation of Segregation] (showing that blacks
who attend desegregated high schools are more likely to attend desegregated colleges and
major in scientific or technical fields) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
156. William G. Bowen, Expert Report of William G. Bowen, reprinted in 5 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 427,431 (1999) (expert report for Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97-75321 (E.D. Mich.
2000); Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 2001)); APPEL ET AL., supra note 5,
at ix, 11; BUSiNESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, INVESTING IN PEOPLE: DEVELOPING
ALL OF AMERiCA'S TALENT ON CAMPUS AND IN THE WORKPLACE 14, 31 (2002);
DARYL G. SMITH & ASSOCIATES, DIVERSITY WORKS: THE EMERGING PICTURE OF
How STUDENTS BENEFIT, at v (1997); Jonathan R. Alger, Unfinished Homework for
Universities: Making the Case for Affirmative Action, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 73, 80-81 (1998) (stating that emerging evidence indicates educational benefits for both
minorities and non-minorities alike); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's
Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1749 (1996) (writing "[i]ntegrated education ... does not
just benefit minorities-it advantages all students in a distinctive way, by bringing rich and
poor, black and white, urban and rural, together to teach and learn from each other as
democratic equals"); Michel Kurlaender & John T. Yun, Is Diversity a Compelling
Educational Interest? Evidence from Louisville, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note
63, at 113; Milem, supra note 152, at 11-12 (finding that diversity benefits students;
refusing to make distinctions based on race). In fact, in discussing law students' education,
Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla write that white students may benefit more greatly from
diversity than minorities, because white students come from a more segregated
educational experience in elementary and secondary education. Gary Orfield & Dean
Whitla, Diversity and Legal Educatiow Student Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in
DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 63, at 172; see also Alger, supra note 8, at 22
(stating that those students previously isolated from minorities have the most to gain).
157. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811,823 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that the Court's focus in Brown was
only on the inequalities of segregation); SMITH & ASSOCIATES, supra note 156, at 3
(stating the original focus was merely on access for minorities); McPartland & Braddock,
2002]
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Board of Education,"6 the primary goal of integration was not to
make students smarter, get them better jobs or improve their civic
values. Rather, the goal was primarily to eliminate the racialized
nature of our schools that was "harmful to the educational, social, and
psychological development of [black] children."'' All-black schools
were seen as inherently unequal because of the stigma that was
attached to attending such schools and the sense of inferiority that it
fostered in racial minorities.162 Much of the educational research that
formed the foundation of the Court's decision in Brown dealt with
black children's self-esteem problems. 63 Researchers concluded that
black children's segregated social lives caused these self-esteem
problems.164
In some cases prior to Brown, the Supreme Court emphasized
the unequal resources allocated on the basis of race. For example, in
State of Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada,165 the Court forced the
State of Missouri to desegregate its law school because the State did
not have a separate law school for blacks to attend. 66 The Court
focused on the legal education opportunities Missouri offered to
black students within the State. 67 Since no such opportunities
existed, the Court ordered the State to admit the black student to the
Going to College, supra note 154, at 141 (discussing the focus of desegregation and the
concentration on minority issues).
160. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
161. DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
67 (1995) (speaking of the Supreme Court's intellectual motivation in Brown); see also
SMITH & ASSOCIATES, supra note 156, at 3 (noting that the early goal was merely to
provide access to white schools).
162. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; see also ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 11.
163. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 (citing K.B. CLARK, MIDCENTURY WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1950)); see also THEODORE
BRAMELD, EDUCATIONAL COSTS IN DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE 44-48
(R.M. MacIver ed., 1949); E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES
674-81 (1949); GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL., AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944); HELEN LELAND WITMER ET AL.,
PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING 135-58 (Helen Leland Witmer & Ruth Kotinsky eds.,
1952); Isidor Chein, What Are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions
of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT'L. J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE REs. 229 (1949); Max Deutscher
& Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social
Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 254 (1948); see also Schofield & Eurich-Fulcer, supra
note 153, at 2 (discussing the research on self-esteem that was before the Supreme Court).
164. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (discussing a sense of inferiority in children who attend
segregated schools and concluding the modem research supports this conclusion).
165. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
166. Id. at 342. The only option for black students was to leave Missouri and have the
state pay their tuition somewhere else. Id. at 342-43.
167. Id. at 349.
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white law school.1" To solve a similar problem, the State of Texas
built an all-black law school. But in Sweat v. Painter,169 the Court held
that the State must still admit black students to the all-white law
school because of intangible factors, like the quality of the faculty and
interaction with peers, that all-black law schools could not provide,
and which therefore made the education unequal. 70 However, none
of these cases focused squarely on improving educational outcomes.
Rather, the focus was generally on the negative effects of segregation
and its inherent inequality.7 1 In response, the goal of the educational
litigation, as well as the ultimate solution from the Supreme Court,
was for white and black students to go to school together, because
this would provide the equal opportunities that negate stigma. 72
Most often courts ordered racial integration to remedy the past
effects of de jure segregation or to break its current hold.173 Civil
rights proponents and courts visualized this process with an end in
sight; their ultimate goal was to develop an "integrated society" by
maintaining the legal status of a "unitary" school system.74 Quite
frankly, it appeared at times that Americans wanted to integrate
schools for the sake of being "integrated," which in the historical
context was certainly necessary in light of the stigma that was placed
on children in all-black schools. Furthermore, any use of race beyond
that which is minimally necessary to end de jure segregation was
viewed by some as nothing more than using race for race's sake.7 5
This is certainly how courts like Hopwood have conceptualized the
issue, stating that "we see the case law as sufficiently established that
168. Id. at 351-52.
169. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
170. Id. at 632-36.
171. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954).
172. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955) (requiring federal courts
to supervise the desegregation of schools).
173. See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(discussing and evaluating desegregation plans); Gary Orfield, Introduction to DIVERSITY
CHALLENGED, supra note 63, at 2 (discussing the role of courts in forcing desegregation).
174. See Ankur J. Goel et al., Black Neighborhoods Becoming Black Cities: Group
Empowerment, Local Control and the Implications of Being Darker Than Brown, 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 416-17 (1988) (discussing the goals of the Civil Rights
movement); Jordan A. Lavine, Note, The Supreme Court's Latest Rendition of Equality in
Education: Examining the Traditional Components of Success in Missouri v. Jenkins, 40
VILL. L. REV. 1395, 1396-98 (1995) (discussing a school system's attempts to gain unitary
status).
175. John Dayton, An Analysis of Judicial Opinions Concerning the Legal Status of
Racial Diversity Programs in Educational Institutions, 133 ED. LAW REP. 297, 302-03
(1999) (discussing the use of race for its own sake); Scott R. Palmer, A Policy Framework
for Reconceptualizing the Legal Debate Concerning Affirmative Action in Higher
Education, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 63, at 52.
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the use of ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even
as part of a number of factors, is unconstitutional. 176
This Comment presents research that is not related to the goals
of reducing stigma, segregation, or inequality, nor does it present a
conflict with the Hopwood court's notion of using race for race's
sake. 177  Instead, the research relates to the pursuit of providing
children with the best possible education, and taking whatever steps
are necessary to achieve it. The compelling government interest here
is improving and optimizing our children's education and life
opportunities. The following research shows that the means of
achieving these interests involves the creation of racially diverse
classrooms and schools. 178 Thus race or diversity is being used for
education's sake, rather than for the sake of race, desegregation,
diversity or integration.
A. Elementary and Secondary Education
Because the educational research may diverge on certain points,
this Comment discusses elementary and secondary schools separately
from higher education. At the elementary and secondary school
level, arguably the most important and compelling findings about the
role of diversity in education relate to teaching and children's ability
to learn. Over the past forty years, several studies have been
conducted to measure the academic effects of desegregation. 7 9  In
large part, these studies have shown that minority students attain
higher academic achievement in integrated schools when compared
with racially isolated schools. 80 The reasons for this improvement are
multifaceted, and include increased resources, different teaching
176. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
177. See generally Alger, supra note 8, at 21-22 (distinguishing the benefits of diversity
from the rationale of remedying discrimination).
178. See infra notes 179-283 and accompanying text.
179. For a cumulative review of these studies, see CARLA J. STEVENS & MICAH DIAL,
COMPARISON OF STUDENTS ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AT MULTI-ETHNIC SCHOOLS
VERSUS SINGLE-ETHNIC SCHOOLS 14-32 (1993); Carl Bankston, III & Stephen J. Caldas,
Majority African American Schools and Social Injustice: The Influence of De Facto
Segregation on Academic Achievement, 75 SOC. FORCES 535, 552-53 (1996); Bankston &
Caldas, supra note 151, at 425-28; Crain & Mahard, supra note 152, at 98; Doris R.
Entwisle & Karl L. Alexander, Summer Setback- Race, Poverty, School Composition, and
Mathematics Achievement in the First Two Years of School, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 72, 81-82
(1992); William G. Spady, The Impact of School Resources on Students, in I REV. OF RES.
IN EDUC. 135,155-62 (Fred N. Kerlinger ed., 1973).
180. See infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text. But see Schofield & Eurich-
Fulcher, supra note 151, at 604 (discussing an increase in suspension as well as dropout
rates among minorities in desegregated schools that may or may not correlate with
desegregation, but concluding that the research does not support this finding).
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styles, and a more rigorous curriculum. 8' Also, minority students in
integrated schools develop higher educational and occupational
aspirations that can translate into greater effort and achievement.'8
Regardless of which variables are most determinative, 83 the fact
remains that minority students are afforded more educational
opportunities and achieve greater academic success in racially diverse
schools. 114 In addition, racially diverse schools can give both white
and black students the opportunity to influence one another, which
studies have shown also improves academic achievement.' 5
Moreover, studies on cooperative learning suggest that the close and
interactive relationship between people of different races fosters
greater learning and achievement. 86 Researchers have also made the
important note that these educational benefits extend to students of
all races.'l
An overwhelming amount of research finds that this
interpersonal interaction also directly relates to improving children's
civic values. Much of the research stems from Gordon Allport's
contact hypothesis that asserts intergroup contact will reduce
prejudice.18 Following up on his theory, studies have shown that
when children from different races are given the opportunity to
interact through desegregated schools, they are more likely to form
friendships with people of other races. 89 Thus, as a general matter,
racially diverse schools operate as a means of improving overall racial
friendliness and reducing racial prejudice and stereotypes. 9° By
achieving these results early, the benefits are more likely to accrue in
181. See Hallinan, supra note 151, at 737-40.
182. Braddock & McPartland, Social-Psychology Processes, supra note 153, at 185;
Marvin P. Dawkins, Black Students' Occupational Expectations: A National Study of the
Impact of School Desegregation, 18 URBAN EDUC. 98, 106 (1983); Wells & Crain, supra
note 152, at 536-46.
183. The issue of what variables are actually determinative in the results could be an
important matter in the narrowly tailored analysis because it may require that, if possible,
race-neutral means are used. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
184. Hallinan, supra note 151, at 741-42.
185. See Slavin, Cooperative Learning, supra note 151, at 632-33 (discussing an
increase in cross-racial friendships and academic achievement in a forced integrated study
on learning).
186. Id.
187. See supra note 156 (discussing the benefits of diversity to students of all races).
188. See generally GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
189. Braddock et al., supra note 153, at 262; Hallinan & Smith, supra note 153, at 8;
Schofield & Eurich-Fulcher, supra note 153, at 478-87 (discussing the multiple factors in
desegregated schools that contribute to the formation of strong friendships).
190. Hallinan, supra note 151, at 745-46.
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the long term and be carried into adulthood.191 Adults who went to
racially diverse schools are more likely to attend diverse colleges and
universities, live in integrated neighborhoods, and work in racially
diverse settings. I92 Furthermore, exposing students to diversity has
been shown to improve citizenship, increase political participation,
and foster volunteering. 9 3 Twenty or thirty years ago these long term
benefits may have seemed only desirable, but with the changing
demographics of our country 194 they may have become absolutely
necessary. Learning these civic values at an early age will prepare
children for the world they will enter as adults, one in which the
majority of people in the United States are racial minorities.9 5 By
attending racially diverse schools, children will be less prejudiced,
more understanding, and thus more capable of interacting in a
racially diverse society.196 This ability to interact will be valuable,
particularly in an increasingly diverse workplace.
Studies show that students from racially diverse schools accrue
multiple benefits in the job market. 197 Over the course of eradicating
de jure school segregation, there has been a corresponding
desegregation in employment. 98 Therefore, today's graduates face a
much different work environment than they would have thirty years
ago. The academic research on this issue concludes that students who
matriculate from and develop social values in racially diverse schools
will be better prepared to succeed in today's work environment. I99
191. See generally Braddock et al., supra note 153 (providing an overview of studies
showing the long term effects of school desegregation).
192. Id. at 261-62.
193. See, e.g., Kurlaender & Yun, supra note 156, at 113, 130.
194. Martha Farnsworth Riche, America's Diversity and Growth: Signposts for the 21st
Century, 55 POPULATION BULL. 3 (2000); Mary C. Waters, Immigration, Intermarriage,
and the Challenges of Measuring Racial/Ethnic Identities, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1735
(2000); Editorial, The Minority Majority: Our Shifting Demographics Are Proof of Their
Insignificance, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 4,2000, at N12.
195. APPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (noting that the country will soon be majority-
minority); The Minority Majority: Our Shifting Demographics Are Proof of Their
Insignificance, supra note 154 (citing that California is already officially a majority-
minority state).
196. Wood & Sonleitner, supra note 153, at 14-15 (finding that exposure to many races
as a child has "real and lasting improvement in racial attitudes into adulthood").
197. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text; see also Kurlaender & Yun, supra
note 156, at 130 (reporting that students also believe diversity benefits them in the job
market).
198. Dawkins & Braddock, supra note 151, at 402-03; McPartland & Braddock, Going
to College, supra note 154, at 150-51.
199. McPartland & Braddock, Going to College, supra note 154, at 151 (asserting that
minorities who attend integrated schools are more successful in desegregated situations
later in life); see also McPartland & Braddock, How Minorities Continue to Be Excluded,
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While these benefits extend to students of all races,2' racial minorities
may achieve additional benefits. Although the job market is not
rigidly segregated today, the inroads to entering it are still often de
facto separate, and racial minorities who go to racially isolated
schools have fewer opportunities in this job market than do white
students and minorities who go to racially diverse schools2 '
Attending racially diverse schools opens up social networks to racial
minorities, 2 which often lead. to additional job opportunities. As
these benefits increase, they will perpetuate themselves naturally, and
further integrate the job market and social networks 2 3
In addition to the employment benefits that result from racially
diverse educational settings, minority students in particular receive
generalized academic benefits. For example, a study by Carl
Bankston and Stephen Caldas shows that racial diversity is linked to
an improvement by black students on graduation exams.2° This study
theorizes that the improvement is due to the students' enhanced
expectation of upward mobility.205 Other studies have duplicated this
showing of increased achievement in other academic areas.20 6 Some
researchers have cited teacher expectations as the major factor that
affects the increased achievement of black students.2 7 According to
supra note 151 (arguing that students from predominantly minority schools may be shut
out of job opportunities).
200. See, e.g., Kurlaender & Yun, supra note 156, at 123, 130 (stating that working well
in a diverse environment is critical to success in today's economy, and finding that eighty-
five percent of students believe learning in a diverse environment has prepared them to
work in today's market).
201. McPartland & Braddock, Going to College, supra note 154, at 151-52.
202. I1d at 152 (stating that desegregation generally helps "penetrate the continuing
exclusionary barriers" thereby creating more opportunity in adulthood).
203. Jomills Braddock's reviews of multiple longitudinal studies look at a variety of the
effects of desegregation and suggest an interrelated process of perpetuation. See, e.g.,
Braddock et al., supra note 153, passim.
204. Bankston & Caldas, supra note 151, at 425.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 152, at 41 (concluding desegregation has a positive
effect on reading scores); Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority
Achievement in Desegregation Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 103, 121-24 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983)
(presenting a meta-analysis that shows the positive effects of desegregation on black
achievement, specifically in early grades). For an overview of academic research in this
area, see Braddock & McPartland, Social and Academic Consequences, supra note 151,
passim.
207. See, e.g., Ronald F. Ferguson, Teacher Perceptions and Expectations and the
Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 273, 289
(Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); Ray Rist, Student Social Class and
Teacher Expectations: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Ghetto Education, 40 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 411,411 (1970).
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these researchers, because teacher expectation for minority student
achievement is greater in integrated schools, students' chances of
educational success are also greater. °s Rita Mahard and Robert
Crain have theorized that high teacher expectations are interrelated
with conveying the message to black students that they can control
their own destiny, which results in higher achievement. 2°9 Again, as
this type of environment develops, students begin to harbor greater
educational and job aspirations.210  Moreover, minority students'
chances of attending, remaining, and succeeding at majority white
colleges are greater when they attended racially diverse elementary
and primary schools.2 1'
B. Higher Education
In recent years, research has started gravitating toward the
impact of racial diversity on higher education. As researchers have
concentrated their studies on higher education, a greater mass of
research with clearer results is being completed.' As in primary or
secondary education, racial diversity benefits students of all races in
higher education in a variety of ways.13 Patricia Gurin's expert
testimony before the district court in the University of Michigan's
affirmative action litigation sets the benchmark for much of the
research on diversity in higher education.214 It has been characterized
as providing "conclusive proof that a racially and ethnically diverse
university" results in benefits for students of all races.2P 5 Although
she relied on previous research done by others, her work is unique for
208. Ferguson, supra note 207, at 289; Rist, supra note 207, at 411 (finding that the way
teachers act towards children from the "ghetto" greatly affects their achievement).
209. Mahard & Crain, supra note 206, at 122-24.
210. Dawkins, supra note 182, at 110 (showing that southern blacks from desegregated
schools have greater professional occupational expectations); Wells & Crain, supra note
152, passim (reviewing studies showing increased higher education attainment for black
students from desegregated schools).
211. Jomills Henry Braddock, II & James M. McPartland, Assessing School
Desegregation Effects: New Directions in Research, in 3 SOC. EDUC. & SOCIALIZATION
259, 272-76 (1982) (relying on data from a 1966 study by the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights); Braddock, Perpetuation of Segregation, supra note 155, at 185.
212. See infra notes 214-85 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; infra note 261 and accompanying text.
214. Gurin, supra note 151, at 363-66. In reaching her conclusions, Patricia Gurin
examined national data from several different institutions, extensive surveys of students at
the University of Michigan, and data from a classroom program implemented at the
University of Michigan. IL
215. Introduction to Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan: The
Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 243, 249
(1999); see also APPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at ix, 11.
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several reasons.216 First, she concentrated specifically on how
diversity affects the educational setting and her study is recognized as
the first of its kind.2 17 Second, she attempted to measure and identify
the specific benefits and possible drawbacks of diversity 18 Finally,
the fact that her studies were longitudinal, studying outcomes over
long periods of time, makes her conclusions some of the most reliable
reached to date.219 In her testimony and research, Gurin has
concluded that a plethora of benefits result from racially diverse
universities and colleges, not just for minorities but for all studentsO0
In particular, she identified two broad benefits: learning outcomes
and democracy outcomes0 21 The importance of these benefits cannot
be overstated, as they relate to the core goals of higher education and
are furthered directly by increasing racial diversity.2 Furthermore,
Gurin's conclusions are substantiated by an almost unparalleled series
of empirical analyses conducted on diversity in the educational
setting?
Concerning the first category of benefits, Gurin flatly stated,
"Students learn better in a diverse educational environment."' 24 The
reasoning and research behind this conclusion are quite clear.2 Most
216. See Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 1327-29 (recognizing Gurin's work as one of the
two leading analyses on this issue and also the importance of the conclusions she reaches).
217. John Friedl, Making a Compelling Case for Diversity in College Admissions, 61 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1, 36 (1999) (quoting Editorial, Racial Diversity: In College Benefits Are
Clear and Lasting, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 27,1999, at 10A).
218. IiL
219. See Gurin, supra note 151, at 365-66 (studying outcomes over time); see also
Victor G. Rosenblum, Surveying the Current Legal Landscape for Affirmative Action in
Admissions, 27 J.C. & U.L. 709, 731 & n.128 (2001) (recognizing Patricia Gurin's
distinguished thirty-four years of experience that includes several publications).
220. Gurin, supra note 151, at 364.
221. Id. at 366.
222. Palmer, supra note 175, at 52. A 1998 report to the President echoes Gurin's
testimony, stating:
Diversity improves teaching and learning by providing a range of perspectives
that enrich the learning environment; strengthens students' critical-thinking skills
by challenging their existing perspectives; teaches students how to interact
comfortably with people different than themselves and thereby how to function
as good citizens and neighbors; improves students' preparation for employment
by teaching them the value of different perspectives, how to function in diverse
domestic marketplace and the expanding global marketplace; and fosters the
advancement of knowledge by spurring study in new areas of concern.
One America in the 21st Century: Forging a New Future, The Advisory Board's Report to
the President 66 (1998).
223. Gurin, supra notel51, at 364.
224. Id. at 365.
225. Id. at 366 (stating that her conclusions are reached from strong evidence in three
empirical analyses and through social science theory and research).
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of what educators call "thinking" is actually automatic and mindless
action."2 6 Most of the time our "thought" is based upon previous
learning that is so routine that creative thinking is not required.227
Diverse educational experiences, however, can break through these
mundane thought processes. When children grow up in a
homogeneous environment and continue to live and learn in a similar
environment, their intellect is not challenged and thus often remains
in the mindless state. 8  But when people encounter new diverse
environments, they learn to think in deeper and more complex
ways. 29 They are forced to face novel situations in which their
previous thought processes may not be helpful, thus requiring them to
find creative new ones." Colleges and universities are the best places
to engage in this learning, because students at this age are at a critical
developmental stage in which they are most suited to making the leap
of becoming conscious learners and critical thinkers? 1 In fact, racial
diversity in higher education creates the exact variables that research
has determined are vital in developing the critical thinking that is
expected of students. 2  Because of the severity of residential
segregation, colleges and universities are the only place most people
can gain these skills and get exposure to diversity.?33  Thus, it is
incumbent upon universities to meet the challenge of engaging
226. Id- at 371. Gurin cites Ellen Langer, Rethinking the Role of Thought in Social
Interaction, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 2, 35-58 (J. Harvey et al.
eds., 1978). Langer contends that thinking occurs when one is faced with a novel situation.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 369 (drawing on Erik Erikson's studies that suggest discontinuity with past
experiences is necessary for personal development).
229. Id. at 370.
230. Id at 369-70.
231. Id. "According to Erikson's emphasis on the importance of discontinuity from the
past environment, higher education will be especially influential when its social milieu is
different from the home and community background, and when it is diverse enough and
complex enough to encourage intellectual experimentation .... " Id at 369; see also
BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 14 (stating that college may
be the only place where many people can gain the skills that diversity provides).
232. Gurin, supra note 151, at 368-70. Gurin found that students who were exposed to
racial diversity in the classroom showed the greatest growth in active thinking processes,
intellectual engagement/motivation, and intellectual/academic skills. Id.
233. Bowen, supra note 156, at 427-28 ("Universities therefore are responsible for
imparting civic and democratic values that are essential to the functioning of our nation.");
BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 14; see also DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 74-78 (1993) (discussing the "hyper-segregation" of
blacks). Based on Massy and Denton's study, it would be incorrect to say minorities are
merely "segregated," rather they are "hyper-segregated" into highly dense racially
isolated urban cores. Id.
2002] IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 957
students intellectually by providing the diverse setting that students
need.3
Racial diversity also furthers another goal of colleges and
universities: preparing students for active participation in our
pluralistic and democratic society 35 It is well accepted that an
educated populace is essential to ensuring active participation in a
democracy. 6  Because our country is becoming an increasingly
racially heterogeneous society, an understanding of and ability to deal
with racial diversity is an absolutely necessary ingredient of
education237 A racially diverse educational setting helps students
understand and resolve the conflicts that exist between multiple
perspectives and also find and pursue the common ground among
these perspectives.23 8 Students who are exposed to this environment
are better able to "acknowledge that group differences are
compatible with the interests of the broader community." 9 Not only
does racial diversity increase students' democratic understanding,
Gurin's research reveals that students who are educated in diverse
settings are more likely to engage actively in the roles of citizenship.24 °
234. Gurin, supra note 151, at 366-68.
235. Id
236. Id at 374. The Supreme Court in Brown contended that education is "the very
foundation of good citizenship." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
237. Gurin, supra note 151, at 375. As Gurin stated: "Students educated in diverse
settings are better able to participate in a pluralistic democracy." Id at 374. Furthermore,
Gurin concludes that students must "learn how to accept diversity, negotiate conflicts, and
form coalitions with individuals and groups" if they are going to be effective leaders in a
heterogeneous society. I& at 375; see also BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra
note 156, at 13 (describing exposure to diversity as imperative); supra notes 194-96 and
accompanying text.
238. Gurin, supra note 151, at 374-75. The very earliest notions of democracy in
Greece also embrace this ideology. It. Aristotle actually embraced diversity. "The
typologies that fill almost every page of Aristotle's Politics show him uniting and
separating, finding underlying unity and significant differences." ARLENE SAXONHOUSE,
FEAR OF DIVERSITY: THE BIRTH OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN ANCIENT GREEK
THOUGHT 235 (1992). Aristotle believed that democratic unity and success would become
stronger in a heterogeneous society than a monolithic one. Id. In fact, he viewed a lack of
heterogeneity as something that threatened the fabric of society, comparing it to an
incestuous relationship. Id. According to Gurin, equality, not unanimity, among citizens
with diverse ideas and civil discourse over issues of conflict cause a democratic society to
thrive. Gurin, supra note 151, at 374 (citing H.F. Pitkin & S.M. Shumer, On Participation,
in ORGANIZING DEMOCRACY (Goodwyn ed., 1982)).
239. Gurin, supra note 151, at 399; see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77
(1979). In Ambach, the Supreme Court wrote, "public schools [are] an 'assimilative force'
by which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought together on a broad
but common ground." Id.
240. Gurin, supra note 151, at 399.
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Furthermore, these positive outcomes continue after graduation.241
These very types of experiences can help individuals negotiate the
challenges that an increasingly heterogeneous population poses. In
fact, some argue that this type of education is essential to the nation's
survival because society's previous conceptions of democracy expect a
homogeneity that is in conflict with the current social reality.2 42
Several studies addressing more narrow issues of diversity in
higher education support the conclusions from Gurin's work. These
studies tend to identify three categories of benefits: 1) teaching and
learning, 2) civic values, and 3) employment. Addressing the first
category, surveys of university professors indicate that they believe
racial diversity in their classrooms increases students' learning
opportunities.2 43 This belief is well founded in light of the substantial
evidence indicating that learning occurs not only between teachers
and students but also among students. 42 Thus when the diversity of
the student body increases, the opportunities for students to learn
also increases.245 In a study by Sylvia Hurtado, students who studied
241. Id. at 386, 389, 399. Gurin's study reveals that students who attend diverse
colleges have more diverse friends, neighbors and co-workers nine years after entering
college. Id. at 386.
242. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (arguing that the nation's future depends on leaders trained in a diverse
environment); Gurin, supra note 151, at 374-75 (discussing Jefferson's notion of
homogeneity and our country's current trend towards heterogeneity); Neil L. Rudenstine,
Student Diversity and Higher Learning, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 63, at 39
(stating that diversity in college is "vital to the health and effective functioning of our
democracy").
243. WHITE, supra note 152; Gudeman, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 152,
at 270-71; Geoffrey Maruyama & Jose F. Moreno, University Faculty Views About the
Value of Diversity on Campus and in the Classroom, in REPORT FOR THE AMERICAN
COUNCIL ON EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS (2000). The experience of Kent D. Syverud, Dean and Professor of Law at
the Vanderbilt Law School, provides a compelling example of what diversity has brought
to education. He admits that while teaching at Michigan Law School he was skeptical of
racial diversity, particularly the notion that it might improve his student's educational
experience. After his class incorporated racial diversity, he changed his mind, discovering
instead that his students were receiving "an immeasurably better legal education" and
becoming "immeasurably better lawyers." Kent D. Syverud, Expert Report of Kent D.
Syverud, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 451,451-52 (1999) (expert report for Grutter v. Bollinger,
No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 2001)). Syverud testified that racial diversity enhances the
utility of the Socratic method as a teaching technique, and even improves the quality of
classes that are far removed from race in law. Id. at 452-54.
244. ERNEST T. PASCARELLA & PATRICK T. TERENZINI, How COLLEGE AFFECTS
STUDENTS 620 (1991). "[S]tudents' interaction with their peers ... [has] a strong
influence on many aspects of change during college," including "intellectual development
and orientation." Id.
245. See Rudenstine, supra note 241, at 31 (arguing that students learn from their
peers). Neil Rudenstine, referring to diversity in higher education, writes that "[s]tudents
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with someone of another race reported growth not only in racial
tolerance, but also in critical thinking skills and problem solving?2 6
The deans of Michigan and Harvard Law Schools also found similar
opinions among their students 47 The vast majority of students at
these two schools believe that racial diversity has provided them with
learning experiences that improved their critical thinking skills.24
And although it does not relate directly to racial diversity in the
classroom, studies in higher education have found that participation
in social diversity courses has positive effects on students' cognitive
development.249 The reasoning for this is much the same as that of
actual racial diversity in the classroom: it exposes students to
different perspectives and forces them to reflect on issues from
multifaceted points of view.z ° Gurin's research, however, stresses
that the benefits from these social diversity courses also requires
racially diverse classrooms?21
The most obvious benefit of racial diversity in higher education is
improving students' civic values. In large part, this improvement
happens because of the cross-racial interaction that occurs in racially
diverse settings. 2  Studies show that racial diversity on college
campuses changes student attitudes and reduces prejudices,23
creating a climate in which students are better suited to get along with
people of other races. 4 Once this attitudinal shift occurs, the positive
benefit in countless ways from the opportunity to live and learn among peers whose
perspectives and experiences differ from their own. A diverse educational environment
challenges them to explore ideas and arguments at a deeper level." Idi They are forced to
elevate their thinking to a level that can be attained only when their own ideas are
challenged by students who have different ideas. Id
246. See Hurtado, supra note 151, at 198.
247. Orfield & Whitla, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 156, at 154-72.
248. Id. at 158 tbl.8.
249. See, e.g., Adams & Zhou-McGovern, supra note 151, at 6 (describing the positive
effects of diverse learning environments on the cognitive development of undergraduates).
250. Id.
251. Gurin, supra note 151, at 376-77.
252. See ALLPORT, supra note 188, at 251-67. Allport introduced the "contact
hypothesis," arguing contact with people from different races reduces prejudice toward
them. Id. James L. Werth and Charles G. Lord define the hypothesis, stating that
"contact with members of a negatively stereotyped group might ameliorate attitudes both
toward the specific group member or members with whom contact occurred, and toward
the group as a whole." Previous Conceptions of the Typical Group Member and the
Contact Hypothesis, 13 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOC. 351,351 (1992).
253. See, e.g., Astin, supra note 151, at 46-48; Hurtado, supra note 151, at 189-90;
MATHTECH, INC., supra note 151, at vii-4.
254. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 225
(1998) (finding that college helped students get along with and work with students of
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civic benefits are far reaching. Individuals learning in these settings
form friendships with people of different races, are more likely to
work for employers who employ a racially diverse work force, and are
more likely to live in integrated housing2 5 Furthermore, these
benefits persist over timeY6 These benefits culminate in "acceptance
of people of different races/cultures, cultural awareness, tolerance of
people with different beliefs, and leadership abilities." 7  Each of
these outcomes is particularly important in maintaining the vitality of
a democracy because they each directly relate to the individual's
participation in a pluralistic society. Students who learn this
acceptance are more likely to support basic democratic values such as
political inclusionP 8
In a more concrete way, racial diversity in educational settings
improves students' ability to obtain jobs and succeed in the job
market. In fact, some researchers argue that the major benefit of
going to desegregated and racially diverse schools is the increased
opportunity for minorities in the job market2 9 Research tends to
show that minorities who attend racially segregated schools also have
racially segregated social networks that effectively operate to narrow
their occupational opportunities!' ° In contrast, racial minorities who
different races); Hawley et al., supra note 153, at 426 (discussing how diversity can reduce
prejudice when properly implemented).
255. Braddock et. al., supra note 153, at 261-64 (reviewing studies that collectively
show that students who attend desegregated high schools and colleges are more likely to
live in integrated neighborhoods, have racially diverse friends, and work in racially diverse
firms); Janet Ward Schofield, Maximizing the Benefits of Student Diversity: Lessons from
School Desegregation Research, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 63, at 107; see
also Dawkins & Braddock, supra note 151, at 397-400 (reviewing studies that black
students from desegregated high schools are more likely to persist at majority white
colleges, have higher job expectations, live in integrated neighborhoods, and work in
desegregated job settings).
256. See Gurin, supra note 151, at 386,389, 399.
257. Hurtado, supra note 151, at 200.
258. Gurin, supra note 151, at 399-400 (discussing the increased cross-racial interaction
and the willingness to accept the interests of the broader community).
National studies dealing with changes during the college years in attitudes and
values related to civil rights, civil liberties, racism, anti-Semitism, or general
tolerance for nonconformity uniformly report shifts toward social, racial, ethnic,
and political tolerance and greater support for the rights of individuals in a wide
variety of areas.
PASCARELLA & TERENZINI, supra note 244, at 279.
259. See, e.g., Kermit Daniel et al., Racial Differences in the Effects of College Quality
and Student Body Diversity on Wages, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 63, at 221;
McPartland & Braddock, Going to College, supra note 154, at 141.
260. See Braddock & McPartland, How Minorities Continue to Be Excluded, supra note
154, at 8.
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attend diverse schools have greater occupational aspirations, leading
to increased motivation, and resulting in increased accomplishment. 261
Racial minorities, however, are not the only students for whom
racially diverse schools increase employment opportunities.2 62 All
students need to be prepared to meet the new challenges that an
increasingly diverse business environment will present.263  New
employees will have no choice but to deal with people who come
from different cultural, ethnic, and racial backgrounds 4  These
differences may create barriers to interaction for those from racially
isolated backgrounds.2 65 Thus, obtaining diversity skills is "essential"
for students' success in the new economy 66 Universities and colleges
that maintain racially diverse student bodies are best able to prepare
students for this changing work environment by teaching them the
skills necessary to succeed in the new economy 67 Furthermore,
employers who foresee the coming of a more multicultural world
261. See generally Braddock & McPartland, Social and Academic Consequences, supra
note 151 (showing improved academic achievement and preparation for diverse work
settings as a consequence of desegregated schools). However, it is important to note that
the results may simply relate to the increased opportunities.
262. BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 14-15 (stating that
benefits accrue for "all graduates"); Daniel et al., supra note 259, at 221; MATHTECH,
INC., supra note 151, at I-1; Carnevale, supra note 154, at 20; see also Gurin, supra note
151, at 364, 401 (showing the overall benefits for students of all races and stating that
diversity prepares students to live and work in our society); Milem, supra note 152, at 12
(finding an increase in wages of students who attended racially diverse universities).
263. See BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 33 (concluding
that these "skills are essential to the nation's success"); Gerry Romano, Including All, 52
ASS'N MGMT. 30, 32 (2000) (addressing the changing racial and ethnic diversity in the
workplace).
264. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 254, at 225. "As the population of the country
becomes even more diverse,... the need to work effectively with individuals of other
races will become an increasingly inescapable reality to members of every racial group."
Id.
265. Thomas J. Sugrue, Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue, reprinted in 5 MICH. J
RACE & L. 261, 264 (1999) (expert reports for Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97-75321 (E.D.
Mich. 2000); Grutter v. Bollinger No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 2001)) (stating that
segregation reinforces perceptions of racial difference and limits the employment
opportunities of minorities); BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at
32-34 (suggesting that people who have not acquired diversity skill will not be prepared
for the new economy). "Persons of different races likely have some differences that are
real, based on their different cultures and experiences," which can work to build
stereotypes. Palmer, supra note 175, at 76 n.67.
266. BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 33.
267. Palmer, supra note 175, at 62; Carnevale, supra note 154, at 20-21; see also
MATHTECH, INC., supra note 151, at I-1 (concluding that diversity can meet the challenge
of preparing students for the workplace); Milem, supra note 152, at 1 (discussing the need
to teach students certain skills and discussing the fact that diversity enhances schools'
ability to do this).
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prefer students who have a multicultural education.268 Not only do
employers want employees who can navigate the work environment
socially, but employers also want a racially diverse workforce because
they believe that it improves productivity.269 Studies show that racial
and ethnic diversity promotes problem solving and the creation of
more effective and feasible ideas in the workplaceY0  In jobs that
require teamwork and creativity, racial diversity appears to be an
invaluable asset to an employer. It is important to note, however,
that this type of increased work productivity accrues only when the
employees understand how to function in diverse settings.2 1  The
forum that creates understanding is school. Since the majority of
individuals in the United States attend racially segregated primary
and secondary schools272 and an even larger majority live in racially
segregated neighborhoods,27 3 colleges and universities are the only
268. See BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 33-34 (finding
that top companies value the skills that a diverse education provides and that these
companies believe that "diversity brings value to their enterprises"); SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON ACHIEVING NECESSARY SKILLS, WHAT WORK REQUIRES OF
SCHOOLS: A SCANS REPORT FOR AMERICA 2000, at 2 (1991) (listing working with
people from diverse backgrounds as one of the essential competencies necessary to
succeed in today's job market); see also Sugrue, supra note 265, at 290 (discussing
employers who favor employees who have been exposed to diversity); David A. Thomas
& Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity, 74
HARV. BUS. REV. 9,79-80 (1996) (surveying employers and finding managers increasingly
believe a more diverse workforce increases effectiveness and productivity).
269. BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 34 (stating education
in a diverse setting "enhances the creativity, innovation, and problem-solving skills" of
graduates); Carnevale, supra note 154, at 2 (stating that some United States companies
have diverse workforces because it makes them "more effective, creative, and flexible").
270. See BUSINESS-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 34; L.R. Hoffman
& N.R.F. Maier, Quality and Acceptance of Problem Solutions By Members of
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 401, 405-
07 (1961); Poppy Lauretta McLeod et al., Ethnic Diversity and Creativity in Small Group,
27 SMALL GROUP RES. 248, 257-61 (1996) (analyzing the effects of diversity on group
problem solving and creativity). But see Kamalesh Kumar et al., Cultural Diversity's
Impact on Interaction Process and Performance: Comparing Homogeneous and Diverse
Task Groups, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 590, 595-96 (1993) (finding that initially homogeneous
groups are better at problem solving, with diverse groups becoming better after longer
periods of time).
271. See McLeod et al., supra note 270, at 249 (finding that ethnic diversity produces
positive effects in the workplace when "managed" properly).
272. ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 18-29 (detailing the demographic shifts that show a
resegregation of schools across the nation). Orfield's study also shows that whites are
actually the most segregated racial group in education. Id.; see also Tim Simmons & Susan
Ebbs, Separate and Unequal, Again, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 18,2001, at
Al (citing the recent increase in school racial segregation).
273. Sharon A. Jackson et al., The Relation of Residential Segregation to All-cause
Mortality: A Study in Black and White, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 615, 616 (2000) (citing the
high levels of residential segregation and its correlation with higher mortality rates).
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places that most people can learn the skills and be exposed to the
environments that will make them more marketable employees 4
Once they attain these skills, a recent study shows that many
employers are rewarding these employees with higher wages for their
increased marketability 75 This is precisely the type of evidence that
demonstrates the concrete benefits of racial diversity and
supplements Gurin's conclusions about occupational benefits.
C. How Much Diversity is Required?
In both elementary and secondary education, an important issue
with respect to the research on racial diversity is what numerical level
of diversity is necessary to achieve the benefits at all levels of
education.276 To date, the research has yet to adequately concentrate
on the precise critical mass of racial minorities that is required.77 The
only maxim that emerges from the research places the appropriate
percentage of racial minorities at an amount more than "tokenism." 7 8
Tokenism presents a problem for two reasons. First, without a
significant minority presence, most of the students in the racial
majority will not encounter minorities and experience the meaningful
274. BusiNEss-HIGHER EDUCATION FORUM, supra note 156, at 14. This may be
particularly true for white students because they come from the most segregated
backgrounds. Orfield and Whitla argue that for this reason, a diverse educational setting
may be more necessary and more beneficial to white students. Orfield & Whitla, supra
note 156, at 172.
275. Daniel et al., supra note 259, at 225-28.
276. This issue troubled the court in Grutter v. Bollinger. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850-51
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (arguing that the program is not narrowly tailored because the concept
of a "critical mass" cannot be pinpointed).
277. Id.; Alger, supra note 156, at 89 (locating this issue as a weakest link in the
diversity research). Some studies, however, attempt to place a general need to have a
student body of which minorities are twenty percent. See, e.g., HAWLEY, STRATEGIES
FOR EFFECrIvE DESEGREGATION: LESSONS FROM RESEARCH (1983); Schofield &
Eurich-Fulcer, supra note 153, at 482-83. Otherwise, minorities may self-segregate and
their presence will be unfelt. Schofield & Eurich-Fulcer, supra note 153, at 482-83.
278. See Sylvia Hurtado, The Institutional Climate for Talented Latino Students, 35
RES. HIGHER EDUC. 21, 23-24 (1994) (discussing the notion of a necessary critical mass
versus a mere statistical percentage of racial minorities). "Tokenism" refers to the
situation in which a school has accepted only a minute number of racial minorities so that
a statistical percentage is present, but the low percentage does not amount to an
environment that either reflects the racial diversity of society or is sufficient to create a
pluralistic setting. See generally Barbara L. Bernier, The Creed According to the Legal
Academy: Nihalistic Musings on Pedagogy and Race Relations, 6 WASH. & LEE RACE &
ETHNIC ANCESTRY LAW J. 27 (2000) (discussing tokenism in law faculties); Sheila Foster,
Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 WIS. L.
REv. 105, 155-56 (discussing the tokenism).
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contact that fosters positive outcomes.27 9  Second, tokenism,
particularly in higher education, may lead minorities to feel alienated,
which necessarily decreases their likelihood of persisting at a majority
white university.20
Patricia Gurin attempted to address what racial representation
beyond tokenism is necessary, but her analysis concentrated primarily
on how diversity creates benefits, not on the level of diversity
required. Instead of coming to a conclusion about levels of diversity,
she merely explained that diversity is required in three different
formats for students to accrue significant benefits.2 1  In a section
subtitled "Adequate Representation," she merely echoed the findings
that tokenism will not result in benefits. 8  Her only assertion
regarding "how much is necessary" is that: "[a]s the educational
institution becomes more multicultural in focus and its functioning, it
is able to realize the benefits of various forms of diversity for all
students. '' s83  While never explicitly stated, Gurin's and others'
279. Sylvia Hurtado et al., Exclusion or Self Segregation? Interaction Across
Racial/Ethnic Groups on Campus, AM. EDUC. RES. ASS'N (1994).
280. See, e.g., Chalsa M. Loo & Garry Rolison, Alienation of Ethnic Minority Students
at a Predominantly White University, 57 J. HIGHER EDUC. 58, 71-72 (1986).
281. Gurin, supra note 151, at 376-77. This part of her work starts with three concepts:
structural diversity, classroom diversity, and informal interactional diversity. Id
Structural diversity is basically the racial and ethnic composition of the student body. Id.
at 376. Classroom diversity is "the incorporation of knowledge about diverse groups into
the curriculum that colleges and universities present" to their students. d. Informal
interactional diversity is the opportunity to interact with a diverse group of students
outside of the classroom. Id. Gurin concludes that these three types of diversity interact
to produce the above mentioned results. Id. at 377. She argues that benefits that accrue
from classroom diversity are linked to the existence of structural diversity. Id. at 376.
Tying all the categories together, she writes, "Structural diversity is essential but, by itself,
usually not sufficient to produce substantial benefits; in addition to being together on the
same campus, students from diverse backgrounds must also learn about each other in the
courses that they take and in informal interaction outside of the classroom." Id. at 377.
282. Id. at app. B, available at http:llwww.umich.edul-urelladmissionsllegallexpertl
gurintoc.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
However, she does add something to the discussion, arguing that tokenism may hurt both
minority and majority students. Id. Minority students may encounter a more hostile
environment, and majority students tend to view the minority students as symbolic. Id.
By viewing individual minority students as symbols of the larger group, the racial majority
may either exaggerate the differences between racial groups or distort the image of the
individual minority members to reflect their pre-held stereotypes about the minority
group. Id. (citing R.M. Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex
Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. Soc. 965 (1977)).
283. Gurin, supra note 151, at app. B, available at http:llwww.umich.edul-urell
admissions/legal/expert/gurintoc.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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possible conclusion is first that tokenism is inadequate,' and second
that once tokenism is surpassed, the students' benefits increase
correspondingly with increases in diversity.m Yet, even if these
conclusions cannot be derived from the research, one should not be
extremely critical of the research on this point because when dealing
with an issue such as diversity in education, the multiple and different
factors that necessarily affect the campus climate may make it
impossible to isolate a level of diversity that is universally effective. 2
6
D. Distinguishing the Research's Perspective From the Supreme
Court's
An important problem underlies this entire discussion, one with
which the judicial system has at times taken issue. The research
suggests that individuals of different races each bring a unique or
varied perspective to the educational environment, particularly in the
areas of learning and civic values, and experiencing these different
perspectives leads to enhanced personal growth. The basic idea is
that an individual's race statistically correlates with certain
background experiences that may affect his or her viewpoint. Over
the past decade or so, however, the Supreme Court has grown
skeptical of this type of argument.' Justice O'Connor, dissenting in
Metro Broadcasting, wrote: "At the heart of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.' "289 She
284. See id.; Jack E. Bynum & William E. Thompson, Dropouts, Stopouts, and
Persisters: The Effects of Race and Sex Composition on College Classes, COLL. & UNIV.
39-48 (1983) (determining if and how racial representation in first year college classes
effects behavior); EJ. Gosman et al., Predicting Student Progression: The Influence of
Race and Other Student and Institutional Characteristics on College Student Performance,
18 REs. HIGHER EDUC. 209-36 (1983) (suggesting that racial discrepancies in student
progression and retention disappear when statistical controls are used).
285. See Gurin, supra note 151 (stating that as institutions become "more" diverse,
they realize additional benefits, and stating that minorities perform best at schools where
their proportion is in the nine to forty-nine percent range).
286. Gratz v. Bollinger, 121 F. Supp. 2d 811, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (stating that the
inability to articulate a requisite level of diversity does not prevent diversity from being a
compelling interest); Alger, supra note 156, at 89 (stating that "critical mass in this context
defies simple definition" and leads to inevitable problems).
287. See supra notes 179-275.
288. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993).
289. 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ariz. Governing
Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073,
1083 (1983)).
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argued that the type of affirmative action implemented there was
based on the assumption that race determines how a person thinks.290
Writing for the majority in Shaw v. Reno,291 O'Connor argued that
these assumptions "reinforce the perception that members of the
same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic
status, or the community in which they live-think alike."2  The
Court later extended a line of reasoning related to O'Connor's
argument, in effect broadening the scope of impermissible racial
assumptions. 2 93 Justice Kennedy echoed O'Connor's argument in
Miller v. Johnson,' writing that these assumptions demean minorities
because they are based on the belief that "members of defined racial
groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be different from
those of other citizens. '295  Furthermore, the majority of the Court
continues to argue that such thinking operates as a divisive force of
balkanization among racial groups, rather than a tool of equality.296
These arguments have also taken hold in the lower courts.29 What
the Supreme Court is really addressing in these arguments appears to
be an issue of stereotyping,29 which most would agree is repugnant.
This type of criticism by the Court, however, should not be
lodged against the evidence in the above research299 because these
studies are not predicated on stereotypes."° Instead, the research and
its findings flow naturally from the factual realities that exist in the
United States. Statistically, race strongly correlates with several
290. Id (addressing a program that encouraged minority ownership in broadcasting).
291. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
292. Id at 647.
293. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) (finding that an
affirmative action program was based on assumptions of racial inferiority and stigmatized
blacks).
294. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
295. Id at 914 (quoting Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
296. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,657 (1993); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229.
297. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit
asserts, "To believe that a person's race controls his point of view is to stereotype him." Id.
298. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. Early in its analysis, the Shaw Court was concerned with
the bizarre shape of a voting district in part because the shape suggested that the lines had
been drawn to correspond to racial demographics. d at 641-47. Towards the end of the
opinion, however, the Court focused its discussion on stereotypes, describing them as
something that they flatly reject. Id. at 647. The Court seems concerned not with the
existence of a racially identifiable district, but rather with the stereotypical assumptions
that motivated the legislature to draw the lines. Id.
299. See supra notes 179-274 and accompanying text.
300. See generally Alger, supra note 8, at 21-22 (discussing the misperceptions about
diversity and countering the argument that it is predicated on stereotypes); see also
ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 15-25 (combating the argument that the benefits of diversity
are based on stereotypes and essentializing).
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aspects of life, including the area where one resides,3 11 one's political
affiliation,30 2 and one's economic standing 3  The research concludes
that it "is not that a person's race controls his/her viewpoint, but
rather that a person's race may affect his/her background and life
experiences and, in turn, his/her perspective on certain issues. 3 04
This does nothing more than take into account the fact that where
one is born and raised may have an effect on one's perspective.30 5 It is
actually these differing experiences, not race-although the
experiences are tied to race-that affect one's viewpoint and enable
many individuals to bring true diversity to the educational setting.
Similarly, Tanya Murphy, arguing for diversity in higher education
wrote: "The variety of viewpoints that the University seeks to foster
does not come from any innate difference between the races
themselves, but rather from the varying life experiences of the
individual due in large part to their racial backgrounds. '306 Jonathan
Alger, in an article specifically addressing the misconceptions about
diversity, counters the argument that the research is predicated on
stereotypes and an over-reliance on the relationship between one's
race and background.30 7 He concludes that diversity does not foster
an exchange of group perspectives, but rather a multitude of
individual perspectives.30 8 Thus, for the Court to construe the above
301. See, e.g., Ian F. Harvey Lopez, The Illusion of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1994) (discussing
the large influence race has on an individual's life); John A. Powell, An Agenda for the
Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 889, 902 (1995) (stating that race is the best
indicator of whether one lives near a toxic waste site) (citing RACE AND THE INCIDENCE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE passim (B. Bryant & P.
Mohai eds., 1992)).
302. See, e.g., David Bositis, Gore Was Rational Choice for African-Americans, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis & St. Paul, MN), Dec. 10, 2000, at 33A (arguing that economically
Gore was the rational choice for blacks); CeCi Connolly, Gore Battles For Black Vote,
CHm. SUN TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at 31 (noting that eighty-four percent of blacks voted for
Bill Clinton in 1996, and that in September 2001, eighty percent of blacks supported Al
Gore while only seven percent supported Bush); Stan Simpson, Blacks Flex Political
Muscle, HARTFORD DAILY COURANT, Nov. 20,2000, at A3 (noting that ninety percent of
blacks voted for Gore).
303. See, e.g., DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE,
WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 1 (1999) (presenting the vast wealth
inequality between blacks and whites).
304. Palmer, supra note 175, at 54; see also Case Note, supra note 152, at 1370-71
(writing that "[b]ecause their experiences determine their frame of reference, minority
students bring the influence of these experiences to assignments and discussions").
305. Palmer, supra note 175, at 54.
306. Tanya Y. Murphy, An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in Higher
Education, 95 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 515,542 (1996).
307. Alger, supra note 8, at 21-23.
308. Id. at21.
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research as based on stereotypes, it would simply miss the point of
what leads to the results in the research.
In one of the Supreme Court's most recent cases dealing with
race, Easley v. Cromartie,09 the Court recognized that when the use
of race is not predicated on stereotypes, but rather on the
demonstrated statistical correlation between race and one's voting
pattern, and when race is not used as the sole criteria in making a
decision, the use of race can be appropriate. 310  Furthermore, the
Court in this case was persuaded by the fact that although the
legislature used race as a factor, the goal they pursued was not
racial.31' The findings of the educational research would suggest that
race should be used in much the same manner as that of which the
Court approved in Easley. Educators would be pursuing the
educational benefits that result from exposing students to other
students who possess different backgrounds, which spawn different
perspectives.312  Because these differing backgrounds strongly
correlate with race, race provides a way of obtaining these results.31 3
Furthermore, race would not be used in a stereotypical way that
assumes that all people of a race think the same.31 4 Rather, race can
be used as one of the factors in making educational decisions, just as
race was used as one of the factors in drawing voting districts, because
it correlates with the educational goal of and benefits of diversity.315
Lastly, many of the benefits of diversity in areas such as civic values
result because interacting in diverse groups breaks down the very
racial stereotypes that have historically concerned the Court.
IV. APPLYING RESEARCH TO THE LEGAL CONTEXT
The above research concludes that students benefit from racial
diversity in three categories: 1) learning outcomes, 2) civic values,
and 3) occupational opportunities. 316  Any educational program
implemented to achieve these results through diversity would almost
309. 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (reviewing a congressional district's boundaries that had in
part been drawn using race as a factor).
310. See generally id. (holding that race could be used as a factor in drawing voting
districts so long as it was not the predominant factor).
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., supra notes 224-34 (discussing the need to expose students to varied
perspectives and introduce them to environments that are different from their home life).
313. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (stating that racial diversity leads to
educational benefits).
314. See ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 15-25; Alger, supra note 8, at 23.
315. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 151-56, 179-284 and accompanying text.
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necessarily use race as a classification because of the difficulty that
would result in trying to maintain the proper mix of diversity without
using race as a factor. 17 As a result, any court reviewing such
programs would apply strict scrutiny.3 18 The first hurdle the program
would have is showing a compelling government interest.1 Unlike
the programs of the past, however, the compelling interest in these
programs would not be racial diversity, rather it would be achieving
educational benefits for all students.32 ° This distinction is important
because the Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether racial diversity
for the sake of diversity is a compelling interest,32' and the lower
courts have varied in their attempts to decide the issue for
themselves 22 But by arguing this claim as an educational benefits
issue, the issue of diversity-at least diversity for diversity's sake-
can be avoided, as racial diversity is merely the means for achieving
educational benefits. And if schools were actually pursuing the
educational benefits, it is hard to imagine how a court could argue
that improving learning, civic values, and job opportunities are not
the type of compelling interests that a state should promote.32 In
fact, the Supreme Court has suggested that these are the very
purposes of education in our society.324 Based on the historical
support of education in general and the compelling policy behind
317. See, e.g., Hunter ex rel Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063
(9th Cir. 1999); Bowen, supra note 156, at 434-35.
318. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (requiring the
application of strict scrutiny to all racial classifications).
319. Id
320. Palmer, supra note 175, at 50.
321. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir.
2001); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790,796 (1st Cir. 1998).
322. See supra note 26.
323. Congress itself passed education legislation in 1994, stating its goals as: teaching
civics, teaching students to use their mind, teaching responsible citizenship, and preparing
students for productive employment. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No.
103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); 20 U.S.C.
§ 5812(3)(A) (2000); see also Lisa Kelley, Yearning For Lake Wobegon: The Quest For the
Best Test At the Expense of the Best Education, S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 41, 75 (1998)
(concluding that the "intention of educational reform is to provide all American children
with an in-depth education, comparable to our foreign peers, an education that will allow
them to compete in the global economy of the twenty-first century").
324. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). Bethel stated that the
inculcation of civic values is "truly 'the work of schools.'" Id. (citing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), the Court stated that "[t]his Nation long ago committed itself to primary
reliance upon publicly supported public education to serve its important goals in secular
education." IL at 658. And teaching good civic values, higher levels of thought, and
preparation for the job market are certainly part of a secular education. Bethel, 478 U.S.
at 683.
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improving educational outcomes, an educational program that
resulted in these benefits should satisfy the first prong of strict
scrutiny.
These programs would also appear to meet the second prong of
the strict scrutiny analysis: narrowly tailored means. First, the
Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to schools in matters of
curriculum and educational judgments.3" According to the Court,
deference is appropriate because the educator has the expert
judgment and vantage point, not the court system.326 William Bowen,
current president of the Andrew W. Mellon foundation and former
president of Princeton University, argues that granting educational
institutions the freedom to control the makeup of their student bodies
is fundamental to their success.327 In University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC,32 the Court held that when substantively reviewing the
academic choices made by educators, judges "should show great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment. 329  Dealing
specifically with the issue of educationally necessary uses of race, the
Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized this maxim, as it accepted a
research institute's educational judgment without attempting to
second guess it through a narrowly tailored analysis.330 Although the
Court has afforded deference in several such instances,331 whether it
would do so again, and -if so, to what extent, remains an open
question. In any case, educational programs must still satisfy the
narrowly tailored requirement.332 If the compelling interest is
correctly conceptualized as educational benefits, then the programs
should be able to pass this scrutiny. The research shows that racial
diversity is the ingredient that results in educational benefits.3 3 Thus,
racial diversity is not being pursued as a goal in and of itself, or to
325. Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990); Regents of Mich. v. Ewing, 474
U.S. 214, 225 (1985); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96, n.6
(1978) (Powell, J. concurring); id. at 90-92 (opinion of the court).
326. Univ. of Penn., 493 U.S. at 199.
327. Bowen, supra note 156, at 429.
328. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
329. Id. at 199 (citing Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225).
330. Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir.
1999) (refusing to second guess the University's professional judgment that race was
necessary to create the type of setting required to do its research).
331. Univ. of Penn., 493 U.S. at 199; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225; Bd. of Curators of the
Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96, n.6 (1978) (Powell, J. concurring); id. at 90-92
(opinion of the court).
332. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (requiring
narrowly tailored means for all racial classifications).
333. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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promote integration. Rather, maintaining racial diversity is the direct
means of achieving the desired educational outcomes.3 1 One might
argue that a simple diversity of ideas is "true diversity," and can
achieve the same learning outcomes without the need for a racially
diverse student body, but this is not what the research shows.
Although it does show that courses on diversity result in these
outcomes, a strong causal factor in these results is the amount of
racial diversity in these classrooms. 335 Such findings show that the
diversity of ideas in conjunction with racial diversity is what leads to
the learning benefits.3 16 This conclusion seems intuitive with respect
to the civic and occupational benefits, as reading about cultural
differences may not give students a full understanding. Students'
attitude changes and ability to work with others are based upon direct
interaction with individuals of other races, which allows them to
overcome stereotypes and appreciate the diversity that exists even
within other racial groups themselves.3 37 In fact, what students often
learn is the Supreme Court's own assertion: race does not determine
who one is or what one thinks.38 Quite simply, racial diversity "is the
most effective of all weapons in challenging stereotypical
preconceptions. '339 However, they also learn that because of race,
individuals often have different experiences that shape different
perspectives. 340 The research findings and implications demonstrate
that racial diversity works tightly in conjunction with understanding
viewpoints and adopting positive civic values? 41 Therefore, it is likely
that at this point in our history, no other alternative to race exists that
would garner the same results. 42 Assuming that the research is
conclusive, an educational program founded on race neutrality simply
would not be able to achieve these educational benefits.4 3 If the
aforementioned statements are correct, then the only issue remaining
334. Gurin, supra note 151, at 364 (discussing how diversity improves education).
335. IdL at 376.
336. Id at 376-77.
337. See generally Slavin, Cooperative Learning, supra note 151, at 630-33 (discussing
various studies demonstrating the benefits of racial interaction in the classroom).
338. See generally Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (discussing the
demeaning notion that people of the same race all think alike).
339. Alger, supra note 156, at 80.
340. Alger, supra note 8; Palmer, supra note 175, at 54-55.
341. See supra notes 188-196,235-41 and accompanying text.
342. Bowen, supra note 156, at 434 (concluding that no alternative to race would be as
effective "in enrolling an academically wee prepared and diverse student body").
343. See Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th
Cir. 1999) (concluding that it would not be possible to obtain the needed ethnic diversity
without using racial classifications).
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in the narrowly tailored analysis should be how much racial diversity
is necessary.
As to this, the research is probably not sufficient. In cases to
which strict scrutiny is applied, the Supreme Court consistently has
required a strong evidentiary basis to support the conclusion that race
consciousness is necessary.344 The large volume of research appears
to present this evidence in regard to the compelling interest and most
of the narrow tailoring analysis, but the research is clearly lacking in
the area of how much diversity is needed."4s A requirement of
something more than tokenism may not be specific enough,
particularly because tokenism is tinged with vagueness as to absolute
percentages. This vagueness could easily lead the Court to conclude
that a program that attempted to achieve a certain level of racial
diversity was either underinclusive or overbroad. Based on the
Court's skepticism of racial classifications, it is likely to require proof
that a precise amount of racial diversity garners the desired results. 46
However, if the deduction from Gurin's work that benefits increase as
diversity increases can be shown, then this problem may not arise.
Conversely, it may be practically impossible to identify an "adequate"
representation level due to the multiple variables affecting campus
climate and educational settings. If such is the case, the Court should
not hold educators responsible for this practical shortcoming.
Although these questions may limit the current ability of a school
to implement a racially diverse educational program, the most
important educational findings have already been achieved. The
remaining issue of critical mass necessities may be either a
technicality that can be settled with directed research, or something
for which educators are not responsible. Finally, because students of
all races would benefit from a racially diverse education, it would be
difficult to argue that race consciousness burdens anyone. 3 7 The
344. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,228 (1995).
345. See supra notes 276-86 and accompanying text.
346. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (discussing the burden that racial classifications place on the individuals whom
they are not intended to benefit). The Court's objective would probably be to find the
point at which the least amount of racial diversity results in the largest amount of benefits.
347. See Bowen, supra note 156, at 429 (stating that no students have a right to a spot
in a particular college, but rather that the college has "an obligation to make use of the
limited number of places in each entering class so as to advance as effectively as possible
the broad purposes the school seeks to serve"). Universities are concerned with the
overall quality of the education it provides, which is enhances not only by the individual
qualities of students, but also by "the characteristics of the entire group of students who
share in a common educational experience." Id. Their purpose is "to assemble a total
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benefits necessarily require the presence of a racially diverse student
body, which is not the same as a preference for one group over
another, but rather a preference for a pluralistic setting. For instance,
if a white student were denied admission to a program, he would not
succeed with a claim that he has better standardized scores than those
who were admitted because standardized scores are not the only
ingredient that is necessary for the student body to benefit from one
another. Instead, the argument against such a plaintiff is that if the
school relied only on standardized scores, the result might be a
diminished educational environment that deprived students of all
races of the type of diversity necessary for their success.8 As the
former president of Princeton states in relation to assembling a
student body, "[t]hough clearly relevant, grades and test scores are by
no means all that matter." 9
CONCLUSION
The research presented in this Comment provides three different
justifications for the recognition of a new compelling interest. To
make use of this research, however, educators must reconceptualize
why racial diversity is important. They must promote improving
educational outcomes that result from racial diversity, instead of
pursuing racial diversity for its own intrinsic worth. Racial diversity
in education directly results in improved learning outcomes, civic
values, and occupational opportunities for students of all races. A
choice to pursue these ends must be a professional judgment by
educators, based on their desire to provide all students with the best
possible education. In light of the Supreme Court precedent, courts
should afford this educational judgment great deference. If this
course of analysis is accepted, any of the three benefits of racial
diversity should satisfy the requirement of a compelling interest. A
program that used race-based admission decisions to achieve these
ends would generally be narrowly tailored because achieving these
ends would be nearly impossible without the use of race. However,
class of students" who create a diverse amalgam that enhances the educational
environment. See also supra notes 156-262 and accompanying text.
348. Essentially, the argument is that the exclusion of this plaintiff is a benefit to
students of all races, including whites, and thus does not favor one race over the other.
This same argument could be applied to an over-qualified black plaintiff who was denied
admission at a historically black school that was attempting to improve the school's
educational outcomes by increasing diversity.
349. Bowen, supra note 156, at 433; see also Alger, supra note 156, at 83 (noting the
educational mission's need to consider "factors other than test scores and grade point
averages").
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the fact that no research clearly shows exactly how much diversity is
needed to achieve the benefits may cause the court system to find that
a program in question is overbroad. To assure that programs
incorporating racial classifications are not overruled under the
narrowly tailored analysis, further research needs to be conducted on
the question of how much diversity is required. Once this is done,
educators' use of racial classifications to pursue the resulting benefits
will be completely constitutionally defensible.
DEREK BLACK
